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q 201This study explores how nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) at the recipient end of the foreign aid relationship
perceive partnership and cooperation with donors. Empirical research in the West Bank and Gaza Strip has revealed
that relations established by foreign aid resemble archaic gift exchange in the extent to which both foreign aid and
gift exchange evoke concepts of solidarity, equality, reciprocity, and related power dynamics. The results of the
research indicate that return-gifts exist even in ﬁnancially unreciprocated foreign aid relations. Recipients return
the “contemporary gifts” by providing a special material (documenting and sharing stories of suffering or poverty) to
the donor, which leads to the constant circulation of the gift (“aid for pain” and “pain for aid,” to put it bluntly). The
study draws attention to the complex social and political factors that local NGOs need to navigate to secure con-
temporary gifts, while it may also strengthen the validity of critical theories concerning the missing rationale behind
the ofﬁcial aims of foreign aid.The senses of compassion, pity, and solidarity are different but
powerful forces guiding social relations between individuals,
organizations, societies, and states. These emotions not only
explain political actions (e.g., revolutionary motives; Arendt
1990 [1963]) but also entail benevolent gifts, foreign aid in-
cluded. Giving, however, is a phenomenon that is too complex
to occur without ambiguities and unintended consequences.
Inspired by theories on gift, reciprocity, and social exchange
(Blau 2003 [1964]; Emerson 1976; Gouldner 1960; Homans
1961; Mauss 2002 [1925]; Sahlins 1972), a huge body of lit-
erature has focused on the philosophy of the gift (Derrida 1994
[1992]; Hénaff 2010a; Osteen 2002; Pyyhtinen 2014; Schrift
1997), on its role in social and economic relations in general
(Bruni and Zamagni 2013; Kolm et al. 2006), and on its role in
international relations in particular (Baldwin 1985; Furia 2015;
Hattori 2001; Kapoor 2008; Karagiannis 2004; Keohane 1986).
Foreign aid reﬂects, among other values, solidarity and
compassion with the less fortunate within the international
community.1 It aspires to connect quite distinct worlds: the
developed and the developing, the peaceful and the conﬂict-
ridden, and the democratic and the nondemocratic. Civil so-
ciety actors (e.g., local and international nongovernmental
organizations [NGOs] and grassroots organizations) play aa Paragi is an assistant professor at the Institute of International
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power of solidarity lies at least as much in exclusion from as in
inclusion in relations established by gifts (Komter 2005). As
emphasized by McMillan and Chavis (1986:20), “as the force
of sense of community drives people closer together, it also
seems to be polarizing and separating subgroups of people.”
Foreign aid, whether ﬁnancing a macro-level program or a
micro-level project implemented by an NGO, is not an ex-
ception. Modern gifts or their absence inﬂuence the distribu-
tion of goods in society and hence inﬂuence justice and fairness
as well (Kolm and Mercier Ythier 2006:72).
The idea of the gift is usually referred to using terms such
as “grant,” “donation,” “aid,” “assistance,” or “support” in the
context of international development cooperation. Although
foreign aid ofﬁcially aims to tackle problems of economic
development, poverty reduction, or humanitarian crises, many
emphasize that it should rather be understood as a contem-
porary form of traditional gift giving, conveying values,
customs, and identity elements (referred to as “spiritual es-
sence” by Mauss). Indeed, the modern gift is an expression of
identity with people or groups that one feels solidarity with or
belonging to (Anheier 2014:229; Mauss 2002 [1925]). From1. The term “foreign aid” covers development and humanitarian assis-
tance (grants and concessional loans) alike, but in the Palestinian context,
most aid is provided through grants. Humanitarian (emergency) assistance
is part of the ofﬁcial development assistance (ODA) in international sta-
tistics. While the terms “donor” and “recipient” usually refer to the con-
cerned countries, they can also be applied to NGOs or private people de-
pending on the context.
served. 0011-3204/2017/5803-00XX$10.00. DOI: 10.1086/692086
5.181.217 on June 02, 2017 08:04:21 AM
nd Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
000 Current Anthropology Volume 58, Number 3, June 2017this perspective—and applying the theory of archaic gift-
giving practices (Mauss 2002 [1925])—the ultimate goal of
foreign aid is to maintain relations between the actors and to
strengthen the existing power structures, even if only at a
symbolic level (Hattori 2001). The question “what is the ‘spiri-
tual essence’ of foreign aid?” is not only closely related to the
debate on aid effectiveness2 in developing economics (Arndt,
Jones, and Tarp 2010; Gulrajani 2011; Qian 2015) but also can
be linked to critical arguments against foreign aid (Easterly
2006; Escobar 2011 [2004]; Kapoor 2008; Mosse 2005; Rist 2014
[2003]). Foreign aid can be effective in terms of achieving the
ofﬁcially stated objectives neither at the micro nor at the macro
level if its rationale lies somewhere else: in the domain of social
relationships (Eyben 2005). As it was formulated by Hattori,
“what foreign aid is [in general, social-societal sense], in short, is
more important than what it does [in particular, economic
terms]” (Hattori 2003a:234).
This article explores the nature of foreign aid relations—
more speciﬁcally, the “spirit” of the return-gifts and the per-
ception of sacriﬁce—from NGO “recipient” perspectives. By
applying the framework of gift exchange theories (Mauss 2002
[1925]), it examines how the quality of “organizational coop-
eration” within the aid industry can be seen by Palestinian3
civil society actors (for the sake of simplicity, NGO recipients).
Similarities between gifts and foreign aid are explored by
means of qualitative analysis focusing on concepts such as ex-
change, reciprocity, equality/partnership, and solidarity. The
ﬁndings are based on secondary research and primary data
collected in the Palestinian territories—that is, semistructured
interviews with stakeholders and observations in the past de-
cade. The last round of interviews, themain source of this paper,
was completed in summer 2015. Data were processed by means
of “constant comparative” method (Corbin and Strauss 2008
[1991]); ﬁndings were analyzed by applying the theoretical
framework of gift exchange concerned with solidarity and the
role of gifts in maintaining relations between actors (Blau 2003
[1964]; Emerson 1976; Gouldner 1960; Homans 1961; Komter
2005; Mauss 2002 [1925]; Pyyhtinen 2014; Stirrat and Henkel
1997). One of the most interesting ﬁndings is how return-gifts
can be conceptualized in ﬁnancially unreciprocated aid rela-
tions. By focusing on mandatory elements of cooperation be-2. On the history and reference documents on aid effectiveness, see
http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/.
3. One may argue for Palestinian “exceptionalism,” since it is not a
state, its territory is (partially) occupied by Israel, and it does not enjoy
full sovereignty. However, Palestinians would cite quite strong counter
arguments (based on international law), starting with their declaration of
independence (in 1988), the recognition of Palestine by almost 150 states
since then, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly’s resolution
(11317) to accord Palestine a “nonmember observer state” status in the
UN (in 2012), or the recent step to join the International Criminal Court
(in 2014). In addition, foreign aid strongly interacts with power-related,
political, and social issues regardless of the question or state of sover-
eignty. It applies to the Palestinian case, in particular, since the PNA has
been among the top recipients of ODA per capita in global comparison
since the early 2000s (see the OECD DAC statistics).
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proposals, and reports) as return-gifts and exploring the ways in
which “sacriﬁce” can be understood—this work draws attention
to the complex social and political factors that recipients need to
navigate, especially in situations as complicated as the Israeli-
Palestinian conﬂict.
To explore and understand the impact of aid on social
relationships, business opportunities, and political processes, a
growing body of literature has focused on the “anthropology
of development” (Eyben 2006b; Ferguson 1990; Mosse 2005).
While there have been attempts to explore the personal di-
mension and its relation to professional activities from the
perspective of aid workers (Fechter 2014), other projects have
focused on how recipients and beneﬁciaries think about donors
and foreign aid (Anderson 2012; WHS 2014). In addition, in-
vestigating perceptions from the recipient perspective has
concerned, among other examples, the Rwandan experience of
having their “pain stolen” by a Canadian “audience” after the
genocide (Razack 2007); the ambiguous effects of an aid project
aiming to reduce child labor in the name of corporate social
responsibility in Pakistan (Khan, Westwood, and Boje 2011);
and the experiences of the local civil society with respect to the
realities of “partnership” in Uganda (Contu and Girei 2014).
With reference to the Palestinian context, studies have investi-
gated not only recipient perceptions of and experiences with
foreign aid in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Said 2005;
Wildeman and Alaa 2014; Springer 2015) but even feminist
perspectives, particularly by exploring the painful fund-raising
experiences of Bedouin women living in Israel (Shalhoub-
Kevorkian et al. 2014). Much of this literature has emphasized
the triumph of donor priorities over recipient interests by
highlighting controversial effects of aid on recipient organi-
zations and beneﬁciaries. This paper may contribute to a better
understanding of how aid, which donors prefer to understand
mostly in technical terms (“contemporary ceremonies”), is seen
as part of (identity) politics on the recipient side. By comple-
menting the existing literature concerned with the counter-
productive political and social impacts of foreign aid, itmay also
strengthen the validity of critical, so-called postdevelopment
social theories concerning the (missing) rationale behind the
ofﬁcially declared goals of foreign aid.
Building Solidarity: Archaic Gifts,
Contemporary Aid
There are various forms of gift-giving—as opposed to market-
exchange transactions—motivated either by altruism, self-
interest, or their various combinations (Bruni and Zamagni
2013; Kolm et al. 2006). Among other perspectives, gift-giving
can be understood as a special form of social exchange4 that4. The literature on the concept of social exchange concerns various
theories in the ﬁeld of economics, anthropology, sociology, sociopsychology,
and psychology as well as their interdisciplinary combinations (Blau 2003
[1964]; Emerson 1976; Homans 1961; Polanyi 2001 [1944]; Sahlins 1972).
The main difference between social and market exchange is the durability
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between the actors (Blau 2003 [1964]; Emerson 1976; Homans
1961; Mauss 2002 [1925]; Polanyi 2001 [1944]; Pyyhtinen
2014; Sahlins 1972). The concept of reciprocity is of utmost
importance in distinguishing interested giving (Mauss 2002
[1925]) from “genuine” or “true” gifts (Derrida 1994 [1992];
Hénaff 2010a, 2010b; Pyyhtinen 2014). The social relation of
reciprocity (a gift or favor motivated by another gift) can be
seen as different from self-interested exchange (where each
transfer is provided under the condition that the other is
provided promptly; Kolm et al. 2006:25). In the context of gift-
giving, it contributes to the higher good of society by main-
taining solidarity among its members (Komter 2005) and
controlling conﬂict situations (Hénaff 2010b:79).
In “archaic societies,” it was the constant and uninterrupted
circulation of gifts and return-gifts that provided social co-
hesion between the donors (the future recipients or creditors)
and the recipient communities (the future donors; Mauss 2002
[1925]). As long as the receiver was willing and able to re-
ciprocate, he proved his equality. Because of this, the practice
of giving gifts has never been an innocent act. Mauss under-
stood it as a total social fact, including not only what should be
given, received, and returned but also “what is dangerous to
take” (Mauss 2002 [1925]:76). Even if archaic andmodern gifts
are not identical, both maintain solidarity between the giver
and the receiver and reﬂect power relations simultaneously,
especially when “the recipient puts himself in a position of
dependence vis-à-vis the donor” (Mauss 2002 [1925]:76).Whether
the dependence is a matter of conscious decision (with vested in-
terests?) or produced structurally is of secondary importance.
The point is that it can hardly be separated from the local con-
texts, individual and societal norms and values, or perceptions
of identities and self-esteem.
While the theory of the gift can be seen as a theory of human
solidarity (Komter 2005; Mauss 2002 [1925]:ix), gifts simul-
taneously convey certain donor identities that may represent a
threat to the recipient’s status and identity (Camenish 1981:3).
The acts of giving, receiving, and returning the gift usually
reﬂect solidarity between the particular donor and the recipi-
ent. Reciprocity, however, also troubles the relations within the
recipient (former and future donor) society, since gifts and
their “spiritual essence” (Mauss 2002 [1925]) aim at inﬂu-
encing social norms, values, and identities. Material or sym-
bolic changesmay be seen as a sort of loss or sacriﬁce to be paid
in exchange for the gift.
Gifts and gift relations cannot be understood without the
concept of sacriﬁce and questions regarding the (im)possibility
of gift (Derrida 1994 [1992]). Emphasizing that not every gift(endurance) of relations established by exchange. Market exchange is a
prompt interaction between actors that, in most cases, is without long-term
consequences. The notion of social exchange, however, entails long-term
consequences, builds on the principle of reciprocity, and emphasizes the
importance of relationships and nonmonetary gains; it is more closely re-
lated to other concepts, such as solidarity, power, and dependency.
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1994 [1992]; Kolm et al. 2006; Pyyhtinen 2014), Pyyhtinen’s
major conceptual problem with Mauss’ theory is that it did not
problematize the connection between gift and exchange. In
other words, “by subsuming the gift within the order of ex-
change,Mauss ultimately subjects the gift to the logic of debt . . .
he always interprets it in the framework of exchange . . . [but] as
soon as there is a guarantee that a gift once given will be com-
pensated, we are no longer dealing with the gift, but with ex-
change” (Pyyhtinen 2014:21–23). The “difference” between
(genuine, true, non-Maussian) gift and (Maussian gift) ex-
change is a sort of “necessary loss” or sacriﬁce. In the absence of
sacriﬁce (on the giver’s side), the gift negates itself (Pyyhtinen
2014:25). In its presence, the gift becomes genuine: for there to
be a true gift, the donor should not proﬁt from the gift—oth-
erwise, the given thing becomes merely a means of exchange or
an instrument for gaining proﬁt (Pyyhtinen 2014:25). Or, as
implied in this logic, for there to be an exchange (gift exchange
included), the recipient should be able to return the given thing,
even if not immediately.
Reciprocity in gift relations, however, inﬂuences social co-
hesion and identity (not only between the giver and the re-
cipient but within the communities of the giver and receiver,
respectively; Hénaff 2010b). In other words, not only gifts but
also sacriﬁces can circulate. Both accepting the gifts (bur-
dened by the donor’s spiritual essence or conditions formu-
lated by the giver) and returning it (at the expense of social
cohesion, norms, values, and identities) can be seen as “sac-
riﬁce.” It is the obscure difference between gift and exchange
embodied in the concepts of reciprocity and sacriﬁce, over-
looked by Mauss (2002 [1925]) but identiﬁed by Derrida (1994
[1992]) and Pyyhtinen (2014:21–24), complemented with the
“subtle balance of dependence and independence causing power
and control to be deeply ingrained” (Komter 2005:70), that will
explain the unintended consequences of foreign aid—negative
externalities in economic terms5—in recipient countries and
societies.
Foreign aid can be conceptualized as gift, a unique, albeit
imperfect form of international social exchange between
states (Eyben 2006a; Furia 2015; Hattori 2001, 2006; Kaapor
2008; Karagiannis 2004; Kowalski 2011; Mawdsley 2012). By
deriving their arguments fromMauss’ gift theory on gift-giving
practices and applying it as an analytical tool, these authors
offer critiques of foreign aid (as a system) that emphasize the
role that aid plays in preserving inequalities and preventing
real changes in both economic and political terms. It is seen as a
“total social fact” symbolizing the essence of relations between
donors and recipients. Being interested in “modernization,”
“global development,” “international security,” or “universal hu-
manitarianism” in material and abstract or symbolic terms
(Dufﬁeld 2001; Escobar 2011 [2004]; Kapoor 2008; Mosse 2005;
Rist 2014 [2003]; Scott 1998), donors use aid instrumentally5. In economics, negative externality occurs when the cost of an ac-
tion (decision) is greater (and paid by someone else, such as the public)
than the cost that is paid by the customer who made the decision.
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7. For facts about Palestinian civil society, see the International Center
for Not-For-Proﬁt Law (http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/palestine
.html).
8. Not all nonstate beneﬁciaries are actively promoting change. Cara-
pico (2014) provides a great overview on the differences between NGOs,
government-organized NGOs, donor-organized NGOs, and so on in the
000 Current Anthropology Volume 58, Number 3, June 2017as a sort of poisonous gift to control the rest of the world. All
this happens with the active participation of NGOs on both
sides: under the ﬂag of “generosity and gratitude” (Hattori
2006) in the case of development aid and as a kind of “orga-
nized compassion” (Watenplaugh 2015:4) in the case of hu-
manitarian assistance.
Relations established by foreign aid may be compared to
Maussian gift exchange in as much as they revolve around
concepts such as solidarity, equality, reciprocity, and power.
Contemporary gifts simultaneously reﬂect domination and
subordination and maintain solidarity, or at least its illusion,
between the donor and the recipient. Diverse public sentiments,
such as compassion, pity, and solidarity upon seeing the suf-
fering of others (Arendt 1990 [1963]; Konstan 2001), or at least
their media representations, play an important role in ofﬁcial
donor and private charity decisions concerning aid allocations
(Chouliaraki 2013). Donor states and their public opinion,
whether they are motivated by compassion, feelings of pity, or
the sense of solidarity, are ready to make certain material “sac-
riﬁces” with the intention of alleviating others’ suffering. While
global public debate on foreign aid revolves around concepts
of charity, philanthropy, pity, or compassion, ofﬁcial actors (do-
nor states and international organizations) tend to emphasize
the importance of common responsibility, shared interests, and
solidarity for the sake of aid effectiveness, “our common fu-
ture,” or “global justice.” Foreign aid, however, is rarely provided
as a result of pure altruism,6 and something is almost always
expected in exchange (Stokke 1995).
Indeed, contrary to the ofﬁcially declared lofty objectives,
many donors give aid for “themselves,” not for “others,” to
maintain military alliances, to support business interests, or to
justify moral and humanitarian beliefs (Deaton 2013). Diverse
arguments against foreign aid are built on the conviction that it
tends to ignore the local contexts and identities. By co-opting
local elites, foreign aid takes away “things” that would not have
been voluntarily given away by the recipient (Eyben 2006b;
Furia 2015; Kapoor 2008). One way of doing so is to set various
conditions that can be hidden or explicitly formulated (Boyce
2002; Sørensen 1995; Stokke 1995). Aid intervention, as a re-
sult, troubles the relations between the elites (recipients) and
the masses (targeted beneﬁciaries) regardless of the size and
magnitude of aid (Deaton 2013; Easterly 2006; Kapoor 2008;
Mosse 2005; Moyo 2010; Rist 2014 [2003]). While it must be
acknowledged that the effect of aid on political institutions
may vary across different contexts (Jones and Tarp 2016), it
weakens sociopolitical cohesion by making recipient govern-
ments less accountable to their people, for “the [ofﬁcial] givers
and receivers of aid, the governments in both countries, are
allied against their own peoples” (Deaton 2013:302). Implying
that the primary purpose of an aid relationship is to maintain
relations between the donor and the recipient (elites), this ar-
gument connects theories on gift and solidarity (known from6. The motives and interests related to foreign aid are too diverse to
be summarized here.
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ﬁeld of economics and critical social theories).
The fact that foreign aid relations involve the appearance
of the donor’s inﬂuence and the recipient’s interests simul-
taneously (Baldwin quoted by Hattori 2006:157) only troubles
the picture. In the very moment when aid is accepted—even if
it is accepted in the name of solidarity or compassion—the
recipient “becomes complicit in the material order that brings
[them] down” (Hattori 2006:160). However, since foreign aid
remains unreciprocated in a material sense, it cannot be seen
as a real, Maussian gift, but rather qualiﬁes as a form of “sym-
bolic domination” (Hattori 2001, 2006). As concluded by An-
nalisa Furia, foreign aid “is constructed as a peculiar form of
gracious gift” that fails “to create a space of reciprocal recog-
nition” (Furia 2015:112). From these perspectives, foreign aid
is not reciprocated (in ﬁnancial terms), maintains relations
between unequals (the strong donor and the weak recipient),
and fails to bring about positive changes from the beneﬁciaries’
perspective. As such, they are gifts neither in the way Mauss
interpreted gifts nor in any other “genuine” way (Derrida 1994
[1992]; Pyyhtinen 2014). But how do NGO aid recipients think
about interorganizational cooperation, equality, reciprocity, and
solidarity?
Methods
Research Context
NGOs and grassroots organizations are seen as channels for
promoting peace, developing the economy, or providing basic
services to the population if the state is weak (Uphoff 1993).
The Palestinian nongovernmental sector7 is exceptionally vi-
brant and active, which is due to the unique historical context
and the overwhelming donor interest in supporting the Oslo
peace process since 1993 (Bouris 2014; Brynen 2000; Keating,
Le More, and Lowe 2005; Le More 2008; Taghdisi-Rad 2011).
Civil society organizations provided various services to the
population well before the beginning of the peace process and
the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (later known as
the Palestinian National Authority; PNA) in 1994. However, it
was the peace process that brought about major changes, and
not only in terms of size and nature.
Due to the huge foreign interest in “supporting the peace
process” and the relative abundance of funding sources, a
completely new NGO sector emerged at the expense of the
older indigenous initiatives.8 This “tier” of NGOs was cut offregion (see chapter 4, “DenationalizingCivicActivism,” in particular pp. 153–
157). On the dilemmas that NGOs face in the region, seeMERP 2000 (http://
www.merip.org/mer/mer214/).
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to serve but also from the grassroots organizations and the
PNA itself for different reasons (Jad 2007; Nabulsi 2005). The
failure of the peace process, the prolonged Israeli occupation,
and the donor money keeping the PNA alive means a huge
challenge for the indigenous civil society (Keating, Le More,
and Lowe 2005; Le More 2008; Taghdisi-Rad 2011). While
NGOs are supposed to play a signiﬁcant role not only in
implementing projects in the ﬁeld of development and hu-
manitarian assistance but also in the “emergence of a dem-
ocratic system and democratic practices in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip,” their role and inﬂuence has been constantly
undermined by the PNA and, in some sense, by their very
donors as well (Nabulsi 2005:122).
While Palestinians enjoy exceptionally strong international
solidarity (if measured by ODA per capita, for example), aid
effectiveness—understood more broadly and not simply in
economic terms—has been acknowledged as an obvious
failure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Donors have been crit-
icized for maintaining the status quo (Bouris 2014; European
Commission 2014; Le More 2008; Taghdisi-Rad 2011) and for
their complicity in the Israeli occupation (Dana 2013; Murad
2014; Nakhleh 2004, 2013; Tartir 2014).9. Tables containing the respondents’ proﬁles and details of the inter-
views are available online in an appendix.Data Collection
This study was based on secondary research and ﬁeldwork.
The interviews were conducted in a natural setting—in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip (Palestine)—in which the NGO
interview subjects actually worked. The data collection was
part of a larger project tracking the recent changes in Western
aid policies in Egypt, Jordan, and Palestine and how these
changes have been applied in an attempt to control regional
developments; to understand how Western aid policies have
contributed to the “Arab Spring,” and how the focus of West-
ern aid has been changing; and, last but not least, to under-
stand local perceptions of aid-related foreign interventions.
Aspects of the broader context have been reported elsewhere
(Paragi 2015a, 2015b, 2016a).
To capture the perspectives and experiences of the inter-
viewees working with various (religious, nonreligious, hu-
manitarian, and development) NGOs at the recipient end of
the gift-like aid relationship, qualitative data were collected—
and also analyzed—through a grounded theory approach (Gla-
ser and Strauss 1967). By using an inductive approach, an initial
set of substantive codes (e.g., gift-giving, exchange, and reci-
procity) was identiﬁed during earlier phases of the research (Hat-
tori 2001; Kapoor 2008; Karagiannis 2004; Stirrat and Henkel
1997). These encouraged me to interpret foreign aid relations
within the theoretical framework of gift exchange (Mauss 2002
[1925]; Pyyhtinen 2014). The developing theory requiredme to
collect additional data on how particular individuals working
with implementing NGOs think about factors inﬂuencing co-
operation vis-à-vis their donors as well as on how they think
about the exchange aspect of the foreign grants they receive.This content downloaded from 128.13
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aInterviews were a useful method for exploring these ques-
tions. The new data led to generating additional codes (such
as counter-gifts and sacriﬁce) by applying a deductive ap-
proach.
The most recent—and from the perspective of this article,
the most relevant—round of interviews was conducted in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip between July and September 2015.
The interviews aimed to explore the nature of relations
(bonds and ties) between NGO recipients and (locally active,
bigger) foreign donor organizations by means of qualitative
methods. Building on earlier research that mapped local
perceptions of foreign aid in Palestine (Paragi 2012a; Said
2005; Springer 2015; Wildeman and Tartir 2014), its core
objective was to understand the personal-level feelings and
human experiences attached to or stemming from daily in-
teractions between organizations (i.e., between the NGO re-
cipient and the donor organization). Altogether, 22 people
were interviewed (9 women and 13 men; 12 people were
in the West Bank and were identiﬁed as WB1–WB12, and
10 people were in the Gaza Strip and were identiﬁed as GS1–
GS10).9 They had rich and multiannual experience in working
with various local, regional, and international aid organizations
during the course of their lives. All of the interviews were
semistructured; the vast majority (20) of the interviews were
conducted face to face, whereas two of themwere conducted via
e-mail correspondence. The interviewers were native Pal-
estinians experienced with both qualitative and quantitative
data collection who worked at the Fafo Research Institute. The
interviews were conducted in Arabic, recorded, translated, and
transcribed. In addition to these interviews, discussions that I
have conducted with various stakeholders since 2005 were also
incorporated into the research (Paragi 2012a, 2012b).Related Dilemmas
One cannot move further without reﬂecting brieﬂy on
dilemmas concerning the data collection. The interviews were
conducted by my Palestinian colleagues living and working in
the Gaza Strip and West Bank, who were afﬁliated with the
same Western research institute that I was afﬁliated with. We
have known each other for many years, and this was not the
ﬁrst project that we collaborated on. The current European
Union (EU)–funded project, however, required me to adhere
to certain Western norms in terms of research ethics. While
the chosen data-collection method (Palestinians interviewing
Palestinians) provided the highest level of conﬁdence between
the interviewer and the interviewee, it was clear from the very
beginning that my colleagues did not feel comfortable with
asking their interlocutors to sign anything, including a de-
tailed informed-consent form. They found it “culturally in-
appropriate,” undermining trust. While this was fully accept-
able tome as a researcher, the European and Norwegian ethical5.181.217 on June 02, 2017 08:04:21 AM
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lection with them (as authorities) at the beginning of my proj-
ect (Autumn 2013). Many of our respondents felt it either ri-
diculous or offensive to give a written consent, and this applied
not only to the most recently collected data pertaining to the
subject of this paper (Summer 2015) but also to data from ear-
lier phases of the research project (obtained during interviews
conducted with EU people in Brussels or Amman). The com-
mon experience was that it was in some sense impolite to ask
for any extra “consent”: if the interviewee said “yes”when he or
she was approached for a potential interview to share his or her
thoughts and experiences, any additional contract-like piece of
paper was seen as unnecessary and perhaps even threatening.
As a researcher, I have been struggling to answer certain
questions since writing my dissertation on the subject of
foreign aid to Palestine: do I have the right to ask any re-
search question if the results of the (Western-ﬁnanced) re-
search on the controversial impacts of (Western) foreign aid
(see the literature listed elsewhere in this paper) have not
made any difference in the Palestinian context thus far and
will not likely do so in the future? In addition, as was ob-
served by Kanbur, those “who analyze poverty and discourse
about poverty, seem to do rather well out of it” (Kanbur
2011:2). This applies to the academic sector as well (Spivak
1999), especially in an era that is marked by a constant
contest for public research funding. It must be acknowledged
that this research, the basis of this paper, would not have
been possible without generous funding from the EU and the
Norwegian Research Council. My project, however has been
supported by the EU not only for its academic merit and
potential (i.e., my academic progress as a researcher) but
because the Palestinian case—more precisely, high-quality
knowledge regarding it—is of high importance for the EU.
Knowledge cannot be self-serving; the Western public wants
to see the results of grants provided either to recipient NGOs
or to researchers doing research on them. But one might go
even further by raising additional questions: is it correct to
pay for an open-access article to increase citation and boost
researcher popularity (Van Norden 2013) knowing that col-
leagues conducting the interviews worked a man-month for
the equivalent of the price one is supposed to pay for an
open-access option?10. The coding table and a structured summary of the excerpts and
quotations are available in an appendix. There are two additional papers
that are based on the same data set (with sections describing the data
collection and analysis in a more or less identical way). While Paragi
2016b explores the hegemonic being of international solidarity embodied
in international gifts, Paragi 2017 is concerned with certain culture-
related impacts of foreign gifts, perceptions on shame included.Data Analysis
The data analysis resulted in conceptualizing latent patterns
and structures of international development cooperation—as
perceived and experienced by recipient NGOs—by means of
the process of constant comparison (Corbin and Strauss 2008
[1991]). First, by reading the transcripts line by line, coding
was performed with the aim of identifying basic elements
(codes) labeled, for example, as “conditions,” “facilitators/con-
tractors,” “equal partners,” “sacriﬁce,” “stories of sufferings,”
“NGO inﬂuence on donors,” “the role of documentation,”
“credibility and transparency,” and so on. The second step wasThis content downloaded from 128.13
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aabout identifying connections between the categories and rec-
ognizing subdialectics, such as “facilitators/contractors versus
equal partners” or “sacriﬁce: accepting versus rejecting condi-
tional aid.”As the coding progressed, patterns started to emerge.
Codes related to gift exchange were scrutinized with extra at-
tention; for example the “documentation” (identiﬁed as return-
gift by the end of the coding process) was divided into two
subcategories (ex ante: appeal or proposal writing; and ex post:
report writing). These and other codes in line with the textual
context in which they emerged were instrumental in inter-
preting various documents as unusual forms of return-gifts.
In the third step, the subdialectics were merged into bigger
categories on the basis of their content. For example, the main
code “partnership” is composed of the subcodes “facilitators/
contractors” and “equal partners”; in a similar vein, “inﬂuenc-
ing factors” covers “time,” “size,” “like-mindedness,” and the
“physical presence/closeness of the donor.” Finally, interview
excerpts were analyzed to understand how experiences with
project implementation from the perspective of the nongov-
ernmental recipient relate to the “personal perspectives” within
the aid effectiveness debate (Fechter 2014). The data offered a
much broader pool of ﬁndings than can be presented and dis-
cussed here,10 so only those evoking gift exchanges are described
in detail in the next section.
Findings
The processed data enabled me to identify the most impor-
tant concepts and patterns perceived by NGO recipients in an
aid relationship, in which the donor could be an individual,
a local or international NGO or ofﬁcial partner, a donor
agency, or an international organization. Our respondents’
experiences with their donors reﬂected on the following main
features of the gift-like aid relationship: the quality of a
partnership (equality, solidarity, effectiveness); the existence
of return-gifts (documentation), the “reciprocal” feature of
which remained largely unnoticed and unacknowledged by
them; and conditions understood as “sacriﬁce” (the “neces-
sary loss” on the recipient side).Equality
Partnership in international development cooperation imp-
lies that partners have “equal standing, rights and ability to
inﬂuence outcomes” (OECD 2015:57). However, attaining
equality in aid relationships is not an easy task. To practice
the “principle of partnership” is much more difﬁcult than to5.181.217 on June 02, 2017 08:04:21 AM
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Paragi Contemporary Gifts 000implement any aid project (Contu and Girei 2014). It is a
globally shared experience that the donor takes the lead in the
majority of aid relationships, whereas recipients’ voices are
hardly taken into consideration (Anderson 2012; Contu and
Girei 2014; Deaton 2013; Easterly 2006; Khan, Westwood,
and Boje 2011; Rist 2014 [2003]). Although donor assistance
has helped build essential capacities since the early 1990s,
critical attitudes toward aid have been inﬂuenced by the failure
of the general political framework—the Oslo peace process—
that that aid was supposed to support. It has been criticized not
only for failing to “change the game” but also for ignoring
essential, politics-related Palestinian interests on the ground
(Keating, Le More, and Lowe 2005; Le More 2008; Nakhleh
2004, 2013; Taghdisi-Rad 2011; Tartir 2014). The lofty
principles (such as partnership, accountability, transparency,
and ownership) seen as guarantees of effective aid have been
introduced and applied in Palestine as well. Experienced heads
of recipient NGOs in Palestine described two major types of
relationship vis-à-vis their donors. In some cases, they could
play only the narrow role of “facilitators/contractors,” whereas
in many cases they proudly reported enjoying full equality and
described themselves as “real partners” in project implemen-
tation.
Real partners. One of the most important preconditions for
a “real” partnership is equal participation in decision-making.
Many of our respondents described themselves as “equal
partners” in decision making. As an NGO leader from the
West Bank emphasized, “if you believe in [an] idea and cause
that you are working towards, you can always get the point
across regardless of barriers . . . my experience has been that
donors are not real limiting factors to our goals” (WB3). A
manager of an NGO operating in the West Bank (WB4) went
further, stating that “the Palestinian NGO partners are the
ones that determine the relationship. If they allow the donors
to inﬂuence their policies, strategies, and decisions, they lose
all ability to maneuver. Donors will always want to interfere.
They will always want to get most of the decision-making
discretion, because they provide the funds. In our organiza-
tion, we don’t allow them . . . [but] we constantly prove our
professionalism and dedication that can always ensure access
to new funding and new donors.” While it was acknowledged
that “[donors] may [wish] to control and not to involve us in
decision-making,” there were respondents emphasizing that
the nature of the relationship is mostly up to the NGO. If the
recipient “let [a] donor to impose certain conditions [that are]
not fair” (GS5), the donor will do so. And even if, in many
cases, “relations with some donors are a constant struggle”
(GS5), it was still possible to achieve a consensus. A leader of a
local NGO in the Gaza Strip (GS3) explained the recipient
understanding of effectiveness: “We are the decision maker,
we determinate the priorities [starting with] writing the
proposals [and] applying to the donors, we identify the
subjects and programs [that] need to be funded, [that] ﬁt our
people’s needs, according to our vision to the Palestinian sit-This content downloaded from 128.13
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms auation. The donors can’t impose us to accept certain programs
[that] do not ﬁt our needs; they don’t interfere in our internal
policy and our ways of implementing the projects.” Concepts
such as “professionalism,” “credibility,” “local knowledge,”
“transparency,” or “commitment” were widely applied to de-
scribe a “true partnership” by recipient NGOs. Typical of this
relationship is the recipient’s ability to “propose the project,”
“to assess what is needed in a certain project,” and “to feel
[that] we are one team” (WB6) or “we work as one family”
(GS6). The perceived factors inﬂuencing successful cooper-
ation and aid effectiveness at a micro level comprised four
elements: time, like-mindedness, size, and the physical pres-
ence or closeness of the donor.11 A lot seemed to depend on the
human relations between the individuals representing the
organizations concerned. The longer they worked together,
the more they knew each other, the more they thought alike
in terms of the political context and social dimensions, and
the more satisﬁed our respondents were with the results of the
cooperation. As an NGO director from the Gaza Strip (GS1)
elaborated, effective cooperation depends on the following:
[If ] there is a previous friendship relation [that] grows and
strengthens through frequent visits and meetings, [then]
there is greater conﬁdence [trust] between us and the
[project] implementation will be much easier. [All this] will
lead to successful projects, and we can reach the planned
goals faster . . . Donors whom we have more than one
project with trust us better, so it is easier [to deal with them].
They do not wish to impose their decisions on us, because
they know us well through previous experience.
While the length of cooperation obviously led to famil-
iarity, trust and common values were also seen as decisive
factors, because “like-minded organizations form better al-
liances” (WB4). Since “donors seek comfort and certainty”
(WB8), they were reported to look for partners with similar
values or political thinking. Church-related international
NGOs work with Palestinian Christian organizations, because
“they are considered [one] family” (WB2), whereas religious
Islamic NGOs receive funding mostly from Muslim and Arab
states, simply because “the[ir] culture and traditions are very
close to ours” (GS9). Others reported receiving “funding
from private sources and ‘leftist’ sources . . . mostly from
organizations that are ideologically close to us” (WB9). By the
same token, “Saudi Arabia will never provide funds for a
democratic election campaign, simply because there is no
democratic election system in Saudi Arabia . . . and Qatar
will never support a conference for women or youth rights,
because Qatar does not believe in women and youth rights”
(GS2). NGO leaders, however, emphasized the less bright side
as well. In less fruitful types of cooperation, local NGOs could
play only the limited role of “facilitators.”5.181.217 on June 02, 2017 08:04:21 AM
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and strongest NGOs had experienced what it meant to be
only a subcontractor. As it was explained in the Gaza Strip
(GS4), “There are other donors we had worked with, but not
[as] a full partner . . . these donors are implementing the
projects by their own staff (they have ofﬁces in Gaza). . . . we
local NGOs will get very limited beneﬁts from these projects,
and less experience . . . we don’t participate in the all levels of
the projects, and our relation not full partnership, we just
have some speciﬁc roles in the project.” In such cooperation,
it is the donor that either approaches the NGO or publishes a
call on its website deﬁning its own objectives and priorities,
“because they have all this money they have to spend.” The
abundance of sources raised certain moral dilemmas (WB10):
“When the foreign policy doesn’t correspond with the Pal-
estinian foreign policy, the donor tries to push you away from
what you believe. This makes the Palestinian partners uneasy;
it makes them feel dirty even. Some donors ask some NGOs
to do their work the way they want, while including some
aspects that don’t relate to the goal speciﬁcally.”
The most widely reported problem with the “facilitator”
role was the lack of “ownership” coupled with making ﬁ-
nancially rational decisions on the recipient side. If the supply
side is stronger, if the donor wants to spend its money in
Palestine, it would be stupid to refuse it, even if “we don’t
totally agree them in [terms of] the values” (GS5). Indeed,
one typical feature of the subcontractor relation was the
“transaction-like” nature of the cooperation, the missing
sense of community (McMillan and Chavis 1986) between
the donor and the recipient, and the donors’ desire to “en-
force their own vision” (WB1) independently of the realities.
Contrary to the perceived domination of the donor agendas
in aid relationships, recipients could not but notice that most
of their institutional donors were more concerned with pro-
cedures than with substance. It was a widely shared experi-
ence that donors “are interested in ﬁgures . . . in monitoring
your implementation of the action plans, [they] are more
concerned with their action plans” (WB2). Others went
further, claiming that “donors are not necessarily concerned
with the suitability of the projects that they sponsor; they are
concerned with the start and end dates of their projects”
(WB3). Donors’ preoccupation with procedures made one of
our respondents (WB3) learn “how to address the donors
with the language that most suits their sensitivities politically,
ideologically, and socially; you use a given vocabulary with
the donor” to be effective.
Many relationships were perceived as purely “contractual
and transaction,” being “limited to the cooperative process, not
[being about] who you are and what you are trying to do in the
world; donors . . . don’t truly relate to the beneﬁciaries in the
totality of their experience” (WB10). However, regardless of
the substance and nature of the relationship, “there is always
an agreement [between the donor and the recipient NGO], and
there is a reporting aspect” (WB10). This “reporting aspect”
has long traditions in theMiddle East, and since the ArmenianThis content downloaded from 128.13
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms agenocide, it has intersected with the “expectations of the
Western middle-class public sphere and its technocratic, dis-
ciplinarily knowledge-driven and sometimes rights-based re-
sponse to humanitarian need” (Watenpaugh 2015:58). It plays
a crucial “ceremonial” role in terms of attempting to prove
“equality” (in Maussian terms), which will ensure (the illusion
of) partnership, (at least compassion-based) solidarity, and
further funding. While the “ceremonial” adjective refers to the
fact that various documents are mandatory elements of insti-
tutionalized aid/gift relations, it also implies thatmany of these
papers are not read by the donors as perceived by our
respondents. This experience is one of the many factors that
made recipients think that their identities and realities do not
necessarily matter for their donors.Reciprocity (“Aid for Pain, Pain for Aid”)
One of the most interesting ﬁndings of this study is how
return-gifts can be conceptualized in aid relations. Aid relations
are said to be unilateral due to the ﬁnancially unreciprocated
nature of the transaction. However, as our data prove, hu-
manitarian and development knowledge—such as document-
ing and sharing of pain, stories of misfortune, suffering, and
underdevelopment—may well qualify as return-gifts. It must be
emphasized that none of the respondents identiﬁed them as
return-gifts per se. Rather, the way they explained the necessity
of reporting and doing it in a transparent and credible manner
implied that the very function of documentation is about
returning the “gifts,” on one hand, and “inviting” further aid, on
the other hand. When donors “see the suffering” in Palestine,
“they give aid.” They can “see” it by getting various documents,
such as proposals, appeals, reports, photos, videos, and so on.
This “material” can be “offered” ex ante (to justify in advance
why aid is needed) and can be sent ex post as a return-gift (to
prove that aid was used properly and purposefully and to ensure
the next installment). The distinction is somewhat arbitrary, yet
it is worthwhile to take a brief look at the differences.
Ex ante documentation. Prior documentation was seen as
more important in “real partnership” relations than in the
“facilitator/contractor” type of cooperation, which later was
seen to be based on the donors’ agenda. Its most typical form is
the appeal or proposal prepared at the NGOs own initiative or
at the donor’s request. Its purpose is to justify the needs by
building on various emotions (compassion, pity, and solidar-
ity) and the sense of justice on the donors’ side. It is overtly
used for fund-raising purposes in the donor country (GS5):
“Many of our donor partners implemented big solidarity
campaigns in their countries with us; we participated in these
campaigns via Skype, and we talked to the people there about
our conﬂict, suffering, and the destruction of Gaza.”
The cause-effect logic implies that the better the donors and
the population in the donor countries are informed, the deeper
the humanitarian and development knowledge is and the more
generous their contribution will be. The perceived causality5.181.217 on June 02, 2017 08:04:21 AM
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Paragi Contemporary Gifts 000was expressed in ways such as “most of the donors looking for
funding crises” (GS5), and “they witnessed the suffering of the
people in Gaza, [so] many of them became our supporters”
(GS6), and “I always speak about the suffering which was
created by occupation, by the settlers, and the wall; I believe I
affected them [donors] positively” (WB6). As illustrated by this
reply, the experience of political solidarity (stemming from
observing the injustice of settlements, wall, and colonization
practices) and the perceived sense of compassion (empathy) on
the donors’ sides were concepts that were hardly separable.
Ex post documentation. The most frequent form of ex post
documentation is the report, which may contain a textual
summary, photographs, and audio and video recordings that
complete each other. Its purpose is to asses a given project
implemented partially or fully by donor money. A well-
prepared report is a testimony that allows the bystander donor
to witness misfortune (development needs and human suffer-
ing) at the same time. Its perceived role was conﬁned to only
testifying to a sort of organizational culture, transparency,
credibility, and professionalism (GS7): “after we ﬁnish the
implementation of the project, we send the ﬁnal report to our
donor, attached with some photos or documented short ﬁlm
about the project; in most of the cases, we make a closing
ceremony to the project, and we invite VIPs from the local
community and media coverage, and we put a banner with the
donor’s name.”
The constant “circulation of the gifts” blurs the border be-
tween the prior and the post not only in Mauss’s world but
also in contemporary Palestine (and elsewhere too). Reports
documenting suffering, poverty, or any situation of humani-
tarian concern ex post may simultaneously function as an ex
ante proposal. It mostly depends on the relationship between
the donor and the recipient. If they work together constantly—
not simply on an ad hoc project basis—compassion, solidarity,
or both are upheld by constant circulation of “stories” and
“support” (GS9): “For sure, the situation [in Gaza] left an
impact on the people that visited Gaza . . . they provide as-
sistance for us, especially after they watch the reports related to
the war and the situation in Gaza. These reports documented
the killing of children [and] the destruction of homes. For
instance, during the last war, much assistance was sent to Gaza
by Arab and Islamic charities. The war sights inﬂuenced them
and moved [their] humanitarian feelings.” As noted by an-
other NGO leader in Gaza, “donors like these documents and
use them to fetch more funding for us and for other associa-
tions” (GS10). When NGOs “gave them [to the donors], some
of the photos of the injured people and the children, their dam-
aged houses, they organized some campaign in their countries
to support us, and they show our suffering to the[ir] people.
This also was a positive way in order to get more funding”
(GS10). This “grotesque” return-gift contributes to the con-
stant circulation of gifts and return-gifts by ensuring public
compassion, donor solidarity (at least at a rhetorical level), and
the “next installment” of donation included.This content downloaded from 128.13
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aSacriﬁce (Conditions and Conditionality)
While our respondents looked on the task of “documenting” as
part of the normal procedure, which ensures partnership,
equality, transparency, effectiveness, and the continuous ﬂow
of aid, the overwhelming majority rejected aid offered under
political conditions. Political conditionality (Boyce 2002; Sø-
rensen 1993; Stokke 1995) has been a rather delicate issue in
Palestine since the last parliamentary elections in 2006. Al-
though Hamas was elected in a legitimate and democratic way,
the donor community demanded that it accept three condi-
tions formulated ex post by the Quartet on the Middle East
(Taghdisi-Rad 2011). This policy backﬁred, and Hamas has
been controlling the Gaza Strip since 2007. Since then, the
Western donor countries have not required compliance to a set
of overt political conditions. Nonetheless, recipients in Pal-
estine have always been very sensitive to any perceived political
conditionality, regardless of whether such conditions were
formulated ofﬁcially or were only “in the air.”
As was acknowledged—half-sadly, half-proudly—by an
NGO leader in the West Bank, “since we are committed to our
Palestinian identity, we are sometimes forced to sacriﬁce lu-
crative offers [generous aid] because of political reasons.” The
sacriﬁce concerned two major areas: participating in joint
projects with Israeli partners, and signing the document con-
taining a so-called anti-terrorism clause (ATC) for getting US
Agency for International Development (USAID) funds (Laz-
arus and Gawerc 2015). Both of these were seen as measures
forcing Palestinians “to take a political position [that] could be
in conﬂict with the Palestinian national interest” (GS3). How-
ever, not only national interests were at stake, but also much
simpler ones. The Palestinian partner could pay a heavy price
for participating in so-called normalization projects with Is-
rael12 (WB12): “Donor [demands] to interact with Israeli local
institutions during the course of project implementation with
the Palestinian team are interpreted by Palestinian local in-
stitutions as normalization policy, and that’s very risky for the
institutions, because they can easily be considered as traitors
in the eyes of Palestinian public opinion and become trapped
in a public scandal.” Betrayal likely entails senses of shame and
humiliation.
Recipient NGOs could not take this risk. Equally, the ma-
jority refused to sign the “Document of Renouncing Terrorism
[ATC], therefore [they] do not get any funds from this Agency
[USAID]” (GS1). As an NGO director in Gaza elaborated,
“this document is unfair . . . we are a people under occupation
and are not terrorists” (GS4). Indeed, the recipients in Gaza
were much more exposed to the effects of hidden Western
conditionality due to the rule of Hamas and the complicated
political situation. As the leader of an Islamic charity (GS10)
put it bluntly:5.181.217 on June 02, 2017 08:04:21 AM
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stitutions [is] that they don’t deal with us, because they are
ashamed to deal with us (. . .) some of the European donor
institutions asked us to change the name of the association
and do not mention the word “wounded” as a condition to
deal with us, other donor institutions asked us to appoint
women in the Board of Directors for approval of funding of
the Association. All these conditions are either political or
whatever, [but they] are not accepted by us.
Politically sensitive conditions were clearly rejected by our
respondents. “Normalization” projects with Israel or signing
the ATC meant the extreme end; most of our respondents
were not ready to “sacriﬁce” their identities, their personal
self-esteem, or the most elementary communal (national)
values for the sake of donor money.
There were, however, much softer means of donor inﬂuence
that recipients considered acceptable. While donors were said
to “use their power to bend the will and the goals of the NGO”
by setting conditions, “NGOS [were] often forced to bend to
these conditions to receive the funds” (WB10). Recipients had
to comply with technical conditions constantly, such as know-
ing “the language of the donors, the different set of rules by
which each donor operates, and the fact that you have to report
funds and expenses in a foreign currency,” while “donors re-
quest that you hire their consultants to receive [their] funding”
(WB10). Indeed, the border between technical and political
conditionality was quite narrow: “terms like Jewish terrorism or
war [must be] replaced [by] more ‘acceptable’ terms. Or, for
example, the World Bank mentions ‘poor Palestinians’ [instead
of] referring to the occupation’s role in their economic condi-
tion” (WB9). The ofﬁcially preferred terms illustrate well that
(ofﬁcial) gifts are motivated more by simple pity and compas-
sion than by real solidarity and related responsibility. The
overall impression was that many recipients “[could not] refuse
these conditions because [they would] lose this aid” (GS9).
Technical conditionality was seen as part of the game, part of the
process of cultural colonization of the recipient (Eyben 2006b)
—that is, as a sort of “sacriﬁce” to be undertaken for getting aid
from the international community. If and when aid worked at
the project (micro) level, it was not because of but in spite of the
conditions. It was due to the time spent together and common
experiences gained by the recipient NGO and its donor.fectiveness as well. First, “familiarity breeds favorability”: government
ofﬁcials in recipient countries who have previously worked for a donor
partner rated their advice more useful than advice from others whom
they were not familiar with. Previous and longer cooperation with a
given donor had a positive impact on ofﬁcial policymakers’ perceptions
on the utility of their donors’ advice (Custer et al. 2015:12). Second,
“helpfulness is a two-way street”: ofﬁcial actors were reportedly more
receptive to future advice from those donors that they deemed to have
been helpful in earlier reform implementation: the helpfulness of the
donor had an impact on whether the donor’s assistance was well received
at earlier stages of a policy-making process (Custer et al. 2015:12). Policy-
makers and practitioners working in 126 low- and middle-income recip-
ient countries, Palestine included, were interviewed.Discussion
Gifts, the nature of relations created by them, reciprocity,
compassion, and solidarity are different but hardly separable
concepts (Komter 2005); this applies to foreign aid as well. To
understand how foreign aid works—or does not work—one has
to study the relationship between aid and politics at the macro
level (Deaton 2013:294). To understand how “contemporary
gifts”work, lower levels also need to be studied: the relationship
between the concerned organizations (e.g., local NGOs, grass-
roots organizations, donor agencies, and representative ofﬁces),This content downloaded from 128.13
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aon the one hand, and human interactions and social relation-
ships within the aid industry, on the other (Eyben 2006b;
Fechter 2014; Kapoor 2008). One way of approaching the topic
is the so-called micro-macro problem, which concerns capaci-
ties “to explain the relationship between the constitutive ele-
ments of social systems (people) and emergent phenomena
resulting from their interaction (i.e., organizations, societies,
economies)” (Goldspink and Kay 2004:598). In the ﬁeld of de-
velopment economics, themicro-macro paradox13 suggests that,
while positive impacts are reported at the micro (project) level
by organizations, macro-level effectiveness (e.g., contribution to
economic growth, ﬁscal discipline, poverty reduction, and
democratic reforms) can hardly be proved on empirical grounds
(Arndt, Jones, and Tarp 2010; Mosley 1987). Knowing organi-
zational and individual experiences with aid is of crucial im-
portance to understand the sociopolitical impact of aid on re-
cipient societies.14
Satisfaction at the micro level is not explained only in terms
of economic effectiveness, such as schoolrooms built, support
for disabled people, or funding for buying uniforms so that
girls can go to university. Applying for donor money and
making “transparent and accountable” reports on how it was
used also contribute a lot to the sense of effectiveness and
trustworthiness, even if real problems were not solved (Eyben
2005). Time, as our data prove, only strengthens the organi-
zational relationship if both sides work in a proper manner:
well-written proposals and reports will yield more money,
which will lead to even better-quality papers and better
partnerships alike. This implies that the opposite is true as well:
the less responsive and sensitive the donor is to the recipient’s
interests, values, customs, traditions, and identities, the less the
recipient will be motivated to prepare high-quality proposals
and to maintain the “infrastructure [needed] to comply with
their demands” (WB10).
Paraphrasing Pyyhtinen (2014), the foreign grant is an
“(im)possible aid.” It is a unique combination of (Maussian)
exchange and true (non-Maussian) gift. Although it remains5.181.217 on June 02, 2017 08:04:21 AM
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exchange-like gift (in the Maussian sense), which calls for an
appropriate return-gift. The principle of reciprocity can be
applied to nonmaterial or ceremonial gifts as well (Hénaff
2010b; Komter 2005:68). Regarding the activity of the im-
plementing NGOs, working for poor, starving, wounded, or
powerless beneﬁciaries is essential “if the giving is to con-
tinue” (Stirrat and Henkel 1997:80). There are arguments
drawing attention to the differences between foreign aid and
(Maussian) gifts, either because the former remains unrecip-
rocated in a ﬁnancial sense (Hattori 2001) or because it goes
from the stronger to the weaker, ignores recipients’ identities,
and fails to change the rules of the game and to take recipient’s
perspectives into proper consideration (Furia 2015).
Our ﬁndings, however, showed that many NGO leaders ex-
perienced equality and considered themselves “full partners,”
being able to inﬂuence donor policies and priorities, even if
“donor complicity” in the Israeli occupation15 is a known con-
cern among civil society actors (Murad 2014; Tabar et al. 2015).
The durability and the quality of the relationship (“partners vs.
facilitators”) depended on the “quality” of the return-gift (see
below), which reﬂected the reliability and trustworthiness of the
recipient. The counter-gift apparently exists, even if contem-
porary gifts (including foreign aid) are mostly seen as based on
the denial of reciprocity by placing the recipient in a dependent
position, either turning them into a passive recipient of charity
(Stirrat and Henkel 1997) or making them complicit “in the
material order that brings [them] down” (Hattori 2006:160). The
“exact return,” however, remains unspeciﬁed in many gift re-
lations: the timing, the quality, and the magnitude or amount
of exchange depends on the receiver (Miller 1995:23). Reading
the ﬁndings of this paper, high-quality implementation and
transparent and reliable “documentation” ensured long-lasting,
reciprocity-based relationships.
Since social-exchange theories do not identify reciprocity
with the strict equivalence of beneﬁts, the “pain for aid” gift
(i.e., sharing stories of sufferings, poverty, and misery) can be
understood as an attempt to return aid. As illustrated by our
data, the return-gift is a special “material” that can be ex-
changed ex ante (calling for aid/gift) and ex post (proving that
the grant was used efﬁciently and purposefully). There is a
demand for them, since citizens behind the donor states—at
least in theWest—are taxpayers whose money should be spent
carefully abroad. They are voters whose opinion needs to be
taken into consideration in governmental decisions concern-
ing foreign aid. Furthermore,Western donors—their citizens—
are also portrayed as “sensitive humanitarians who feel the
pain of others deeply” (Razack 2007:384). They are consum-
ers as well, “enjoying the sense of having been a witness to
great evils” in the form of documentaries and movies (Razack
2007:382), newspaper articles, television reports, online cor-
respondence, and so on (Chouliaraki 2013). It is their right to15. “Recipient complicity” is implied in this term (donor complicity),
as long as, without recipients, there are no donors either.
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ﬁnancial support (Anheier 2014:482), and even “to feel good”
while doing good (Chouliaraki 2013). To put it in different
words, “what starts off as a pure gift, an act of seemingly
disinterested giving . . . becomes an object or a service inti-
mately entwined in the interested world” in the end (Stirrat and
Henkel 1997:69). And the “exchanges between sufferers and
nonsufferers” yield not only documentaries and news corre-
spondence but ofﬁcial documents as well. Proposals, appeals,
and reports are essential “ceremonial gifts,” without which
there will be no more aid from governments and NGOs. Pa-
perwork is a testimony that proves organizational effectiveness
and justiﬁes donor compassion and solidarity—ironic solidarity
(Chouliaraki 2013)—simultaneously. All this makes it possible
to understand foreign aid relations as gift exchange, whereby
the return-gift (“the spectacle of suffering” and “others’ pain
or poverty”) maintains a sort of solidarity that is motivated by
the sentiments of the donors and rewards the donor’s self
(Chouliaraki 2013).
Accepting and returning the gift, however, is not as in-
nocent as it looks in light of aid effectiveness principles,
such as ownership, transparency, accountability, or part-
nership. There is always a “burden attached” (Mauss 2002
[1925]). The dark side of gifts and foreign aid is partially
explained by the fact that individuals working at recipient
organizations are human beings with emotions. They “still
feel,” even if “we refuse to admit it,” that honor plays a role
by making the recipient return the gift (Miller 1995:6). The
feeling of subordination to the donor, which can be both
acknowledged and denied, depending on the context, is
closely related to the imperative to make appropriate and
obligatory return for the gift received (Mauss 2002 [1925]).
NGO leaders’ understanding and consent regarding the rules
of the game reﬂects the acknowledgement and acceptance of
this obligation (to be transparent, accountable, and effective
to get funding).
When donors, however, fail to acknowledge that their gifts
are “not for free,” they simply “steal the pains of others” by
consciously or unconsciously institutionalizing conceptions
of Western superiority (Razack 2007, inspired by Sontag
2003). For example, “requiring Bedouin women to share their
private pains in the public sphere of funding” repositioned
the role of donors at the expense of the recipients (Shalhoub-
Kevorkian et al. 2014:16). Helplessness and gratitude on the
recipient side becomes a technical or technicized instrument
serving donor demands and vanity (Chouliaraki 2013), which
further explains the sense of humiliation on the recipient
side. If the recipients (states, societies, organizations, and
individuals) are unable to reciprocate in any other way (e.g.,
ﬁnancially), they are often expected to offer the only thing
they have: donor control over some part of the recipient’s life
and identity (Blau 2003 [1964]:22, 28, cited by Camenish
1981:4).
This control is practiced by setting conditions, by expect-
ing “transparency” or “accountability” for the sake of effec-5.181.217 on June 02, 2017 08:04:21 AM
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worthiness and reliability. To see the broader context, while
the Palestinian Liberation Organization and Fateh were ready
to sign the Oslo agreements (in 1993), Hamas refused to
comply with the conditions formulated by the Quartet on the
Middle East after the parliamentary elections (in 2006). The
former were accused of “selling the national homeland” by
many Palestinians, and the latter was further marginalized by
the international community (Nakhleh 2013). Indeed, foreign
aid is usually used as a “lever to promote objectives set by the
donor whom and that the recipient would not otherwise have
agreed to” (Stokke 1995:11–12). It leads to a sense of “insti-
tutionalized” humiliation and legitimacy problems in state-
building “projects” (Lemay-Hébert 2009). The philosophy be-
hind the peace process, the idea of the “dividend of peace”
(Peres 1993), peace conditionality (Boyce 2002), the role
played by the donors (Keating, Le More, and Lowe 2005; Le
More 2008; Taghdisi-Rad 2011), and critical Palestinian views
(Lentin 2008; Murad 2014; Nakhleh 2013; Tabar et al. 2015;
Tartir 2014) illustrate the relevance of these arguments. Com-
plying with political conditions was widely seen as “sacriﬁce”
leading to humiliating compromises in exchange for foreign
grants; complying with technical conditions was more seen as a
sort of necessary evil.
Like NGOs elsewhere in the region (Carapico 2014:188–198),
Palestinian recipients reported that they either risked their
goodwill or were forced to pay a heavy price within their own
community if they accepted aid with unacceptable political
conditions from foreign (Western) organizations (e.g., partici-
pating in “normalization” projects with Israel or signing the
USAIDATCdocument; Lazarus andGawerc 2015). This risk or
price was described as sacriﬁce (“necessary” loss) experienced
on the recipient side, which is needed for distinguishing true
gifts from exchange. Indeed, for there to be a (non-Maussian,
real) gift, the donor should not proﬁt from the gift (from the
foreign grant), otherwise the given thing becomes merely a
means of exchange or an instrument for gaining proﬁt (Py-
yhtinen 2014:25). While the donor community—charity or-
ganizations included—wants to beneﬁt and to see the results of
its investment, it fails to acknowledge the nonmaterial dimen-
sion of “exchange.” The beneﬁts can be called peace, reconcili-
ation, humanitarian dedication, nonviolent activities, coopera-
tion with the enemy,16 boycott, rejecting terrorism, and so on.
The menu is diverse, and it is up to the identity, autonomy, and
interests of the NGO to make the right choice. The point,
however, is that donors simply set a price without acknowl-
edging the “burden attached” to their gifts. This burden can be
interpreted as “sacriﬁce” stemming either from accepting or
from returning the gifts—complying with externally set con-16. An illustrative example could be the people-to-people initiative
(in 1995), which was initiated and ﬁnanced by Norway in the shadow of
the peace process; its primary objective was to facilitate cooperation on
the basis of equality and reciprocity between Israelis and Palestinians
(Endresen 2001).
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others, respectively. By conveying donor “spirits” (e.g., norms,
values, culture, and truth) and by ignoring recipient identities,
norms, and values simultaneously, aid will remain a self-serving
endeavor testifying to the vanity of the donors.
Since the total price of organizational (NGO) or govern-
mental decisions is to be paid by the entire recipient popu-
lation, identities, social relationships, and power dynamics in
the recipient society are inﬂuenced by various negative ex-
ternalities (see below). They are affected by foreign aid, es-
pecially in those cases where the recipient is more liable to,
more indebted to, and more interested in the donor than in
the beneﬁciaries (NGOs) or its own population. To sum up,
foreign aid can be understood as a Maussian gift as long as
recipients experience equality (i.e., are real partners), it is “cer-
emonially” reciprocated (by sharing stories of misfortune,
poverty, and suffering in the form of proposals and reports), and
the gift (“aid for pain” and “pain for aid”) circulates constantly.
The somewhat grotesque nature of the return-gift made one of
our respondent say that “people do not want donors to go away,
but they wish they could do” (WB10).
This “paradox of aid” may help us understand the irrele-
vance of the aid (effectiveness) debate (Baele 2013; Guerin
2014; Qian 2015). The lack of satisfaction and effectiveness at
a macro level can be explained by taking into consideration
the negative externalities of the micro-level aid relations
(Wood and Sullivan 2015). If decisions of the recipient (gov-
ernment or NGO) are guided by its own (individual or or-
ganizational) proﬁt-maximizing function and not necessarily
by that of the entire society (nation), certain costs shall be
paid by the “whole.” Looking at our data, the rejection of
overtly conditional aid (signing the USAID ATC or partici-
pating in normalization projects with Israel) may minimize
negative externality costs from the perspective of the recipient.
Still, there are certain emotional andmacro-level political costs
(externalities) to be paid by the entire society (Palestinian
nation; Paragi 2017).
While our respondents were sensitive to conditionality,
looking at it as a sacriﬁce or shame (Paragi 2017), proposal and
report-writing functioned as return-gifts, although unrecog-
nized as such. By returning stories of misfortune and pain in
exchange for the gift of foreign aid, recipient NGOs offer the
only valuable they have in a complex situation like the Israeli-
Palestinian conﬂict: transparently documenting stories of the
suffering of their beneﬁciaries. And while generating human-
itarian knowledge is not without preliminaries in the region
(Watenpaugh 2015), this unique return-gift strengthens and
prolongs the relationship by constantly ensuring compassion
or (ironic) solidarity on the donor side. It is a morally “heavy”
return-gift, without which the recipient would be even more
indebted to the donor. Documenting is not simply a technical
matter of accountability, effectiveness, or trustworthiness. It is
not the pain itself but being effective, transparent, and reliable
in terms of documenting suffering that is essential for receiving
contemporary gifts.5.181.217 on June 02, 2017 08:04:21 AM
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The study aimed to contribute to a better understanding of the
nature and “spiritual essence” of contemporary gift relations by
exploring how Palestinian NGO recipients think about equality,
compassion, solidarity, aid (in)effectiveness, conditions, and
sacriﬁces. While the relationship was clearly seen as unequal
between the donor and the recipient at the macro level, many
of our respondents reported equality and partnership at an
organizational level.
Reading the results in light of the theories on gift exchange
highlighted the existence of nonﬁnancial return-gifts in con-
temporary aid relations. I did not aim for the “truth” but only
aspired to conceptualize modern “ceremonies” in a critical way
to see the extent to which aid can be understood as a recip-
rocated gift. Much else could have been explored, as noted by
the interviewers upon reading a draft of this paper—for ex-
ample, the complexity of relations between donors and re-
cipients; the relation between aid and corruption; and the lack
of progress in Gaza reconstruction after the war in 2014, a
situation in which appeals were made, tragedies were drafted
on paper, but the pledged money never arrived, at least ac-
cording to Palestinian perceptions. It would also be great to
extend the research by applying quantitative means and in-
cluding more participants to see how representative the ﬁnd-
ings are. Still, the recent qualitative research generated new
ideas—interpreting documentation of “stories of suffering”
(part of the humanitarian and development knowledge) as
return-gifts—that hopefully contribute to the literature and
draw attention to the ambiguous nature of contemporary gift
relations. It is the “spiritual essence” (embodied in the foreign
aid gift), the existence of sacriﬁce (complying with political
and technical conditions that ignore local norms, values, and
identities), and return-gifts (sharing stories of suffering in
written form and in a transparent manner) that makes foreign
aid relations so complicated. As long as aid is provided in
exchange for stories of suffering and alongside politically
sensitive conditions that ignore the identities of the recipients,
it cannot but further weaken the recipient society.
The “spiritual essence” of contemporary gifts seems to be
more decisive than thematter of aid effectiveness, the latter of
which can be measured only in comparison to the ofﬁcially
stated aid policy objectives. Economic effectiveness, the pri-
mary target of the so-called aid debate, cannot be separated
from the broader context of social relationships. Develop-
ment—as well as recovery from a humanitarian crisis—“has
more to do with the strength of a country’s institutions, the
political and social systems that are developed through the
interplay of a government and its people” (Deaton 2013:294).
If we wish to explain the success or failure of foreign aid, we
need to see what contemporary gift exchange means to the
organizations and individuals involved in aid relationships
and how it simultaneously strengthens the ambiguous soli-
darity between the donor and the recipient, creates rivalry
between NGOs, and emphasizes division lines within theThis content downloaded from 128.13
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms arecipient society. Expecting organizations to share the mis-
fortunes and pains of beneﬁciaries, to detail them in trans-
parent ways for the sake of accountability and effectiveness,
to tell their suffering to strangers who hardly know any-
thing about their totality as human beings—purely for the
sake of further aid—strengthens the validity of “ironic soli-
darity” (Chouliaraki 2013). The real irony, at least in the
Palestinian case, is that these seem to be the best “marketable”
goods that recipients, NGOs included, can offer to please
their donors.
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Power and Emotions: Some Remarks on Compassion
and Solidarity
Focusing on the effects of foreign aid on recipient organi-
zations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Beáta Paragi’s essay
offers precious evidence of not only the ambiguous nature of
foreign aid relationships as (g)local forms of political relations
between donor and recipient states and nonstate actors but
also the crucial role that emotions play in legitimating, keeping
alive, and “ordering” such an ambiguous space. Openly and
visibly productive in the foreign aid domain, the relation be-
tween power and emotions is, however, only partially acknowl-
edged in Western political thought as politically signiﬁcant,
because it is mainly presumed to pertain to the rhetorical and/
or manipulative side of power dynamics and not really “to the
core of the political” (Freeden 2013:9). Intrinsically connected
to other constitutive, diverse, and complex relations—such as,
just tomention themore immediate, those between culture and5.181.217 on June 02, 2017 08:04:21 AM
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capacity and exclusion/incapacity, legitimation and consensus,
and order and disorder—the link between power and emotions
seems thus to have been granted, and for quite a long time, only
a secondary status in political thought.
As convincingly argued by Martha Nussbaum (2013),
starting at least with John Locke, Western liberal political
thinkers, with few exceptions, have never placed much conﬁ-
dence in the role that emotions can play in the foundation and
stability of liberal institutions. It is not only that emotions (as
well as passions and desires) have been often regarded as
mostly limited (and limiting), misguiding, and deprived of any
valuable cognitive and evaluative content; they have also been
mainly conceived of as expressions of morally and intellectu-
ally inferior impulses or instincts to be “civilized,” disciplined,
and somehow neutralized, whose open manifestation in the
political domain is likely to be conducive to forms of ma-
nipulation, the violation of the sacred liberal principles of
freedom and autonomy, the risk of fuelling conﬂicts, unpre-
dictable forms of disorder, and ungovernable conducts.
While emotions have received different treatments within
the context of other political doctrines—examples, in this
sense, may range from the crucial role assigned to benevolence
and sympathy by the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers and the
acknowledgement of the importance of emotions in feminist
thought to the role of altruism (and solidarity) in Hegel’s
ethical theory or in socialist doctrines and programs, of (pa-
triotic) love in the republican tradition, and of pride and dis-
dain in nationalist and conservative ideologies (Campello
2014; Freeden 2013)—it seems correct to say that, speaking in
very broad terms, if liberal internationalists have left, and do
leave, room for certain kinds of emotions (compassion, soli-
darity, and other “humanitarian” feelings) to be politically
signiﬁcant, most modern and contemporary liberal thinkers
have disdainfully tended to cede, within the national borders
and in the name of neutrality and respect of individual free-
dom, to antiliberal or nonliberal doctrines the invocation and
shaping of emotions (but see Freeden 2013:7).
In the context of the recent so-called affective turn in
contemporary political thought, an interesting exception,
among others, is represented by the political role assigned to
emotions by Martha Nussbaum. Starting from the concep-
tualization of emotions as forms of evaluative thought pro-
vided with a rich cognitive, intentional, and eudaimonistic
content, Nussbaum (2001, 2013) afﬁrms that the political
cultivation of emotions is of crucial importance for liberal
societies that aspire to justice and equal opportunity for all;
that want their political culture, institutions, and values to be
just and stable in moments of crisis; and that want their most
demanding goals supported by adequately shaped public
emotions, particularly those goals that require sacriﬁce and
effort, such as social redistribution (welfare programs and tax
systems), foreign aid, the defense of the state, the inclusion of
the less advantaged, and the ﬁght against racism, discrimi-
nation, and violence.This content downloaded from 128.13
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argues that, within the context of a decent society, an emotion
such as compassion, if adequately cultivated and supported by
proper imaginative resources and skills, can be crucial to ex-
tend our moral interest to the other(s), to establish a bridge
between our self-centred moral concerns and the moral con-
cerns for and of others, and to decide to act in the name of
solidarity against any form of injustice, dehumanizing treat-
ment, and exclusion. According toNussbaum, compassion can
thus favor and be fully compatible with the respect of others’
dignity, capabilities, and autonomy and the rejection of any
form of victimization, a paternalistic approach, or humiliating,
pietistic, and stereotyped representation.
On the contrary, Hannah Arendt, in her well-known writing
onHumanity in Dark Times (which is included inMen in Dark
Times; Arendt 1968 [1960]), strongly criticizes the French rev-
olutionaries, because they attempted, through compassion, “to
achieve solidarity with the unfortunate and the miserable”
without understanding that this kind of humanitariansm “is not
transmissible and cannot be easily acquired by those who do not
belong among the pariahs.” Even more disputably, they intro-
duced into all modern revolutions the ruinous idea that one
should attempt to “improve the lot of the unfortunate rather
than to establish justice for all” (1986 [1960]:14).
Paragi’s research clearly shows how the space opened by
foreign aid is a space where compassion and solidarity are a
constitutive part of a complex net of contract-like relationships
where emotions are continuously “activated” and exchanged
(“aid for pain, pain for aid”) to reinforce rather than to pro-
gressively weaken the foreign aid relationship itself, to maintain
(at multiple levels) the inclusion/exclusion divide, and to rein-
force the (cultural, political, moral, “civilizational”) distance
between donors and recipients rather than to try to reduce it. It
shows how important it is to investigate the speciﬁc nature and
dynamics of foreign aid relationships, together with the hu-
manitarian rhetoric, apparatus, and resources that support it,
and how far we are from a real effort to “use” the invocation of
compassion and solidarity to establish justice for all—how far
we are from investing in the adequate cultivation of emotions,
be they used inside or outside of our liberal, civilized countries.Tomohisa Hattori
Department of Political Science, Lehman College, City University of
New York, Bronx, New York 10468, and Master of Arts in Liberal
Studies Program, Graduate Center, City University of New York,
New York, New York 10016, USA (tomohisa.hattori@lehman.cuny
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It was Marcel Mauss himself who, reﬂecting on the casualties
of World War I, ﬁrst made the connection between his “ar-
chaic” theory of reciprocal gift exchange and the potential for
“exchanging goods and persons” for conﬂict attenuation and
solidarity in contemporary international relations—reciprocal5.181.217 on June 02, 2017 08:04:21 AM
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and others seem to be what he had in mind (1967 [1925]:80–
81, 1990 [1925]:82–83). The primary scholar who sought to
extend this insight to foreign aid, however, missed the fact that
American technical assistance to France in the 1950s was es-
sentially unreciprocated, hence outside of Mauss’s conceptual
framework (Dillon 1968). Pierre Bourdieu’s (1977:5) notion of
the misrecognized suspension of reciprocation for an uncer-
tain period and Jonathan Parry’s conception of a unilateral gift
(1986) inspired my own reconceptualization of grant foreign
aid as an unreciprocated giving practice symbolizing and
naturalizing the material hierarchy that makes it possible
(Hattori 2001).
Paragi’s article disagrees with my reconceptualization of
grant foreign aid. More speciﬁcally, she argues that, despite the
lack of ﬁnancial reciprocation, many of the documents provided
by grant-receivingNGOsdo indeed qualify as a reciprocal gift in
Maussian terms, including grant applications, progress reports,
post-project evaluations, and various ﬁlms and videos doc-
umenting the project. On the basis of interviews with aid prac-
titioners, she also argues that, because the decision-making
process at project sites involved both donor and recipient aid
workers, with the recipients sometimes fully in charge, the aid
relationship was essentially an equal partnership.
There is a long history of efforts to distinguish the aid rela-
tionship from other areas of international relations, as indicated
by the evolving terms used to describe it, from “development
assistance” in the 1960s, to “development cooperation” in the
1970s and 1980s, and to “development partnership” in the 1990s
onward (e.g., Escobar 2011 [2004]). Scholars have also extended
Clifford Geertz’s (1985) interpretive approach to local knowl-
edge to foreign aid practices, emphasizing the importance of
local input into how aid projects work. Substituting both the
discourse of “partnership” and the local knowledge about
“partnership” for the reality involving a material hierarchy,
however, is a classic example of what critical realist philosopher
Roy Bhaskar (1998 [1979]:132–140) has called the “epistemic
fallacy” (i.e., the misrecognition of what people feel, think, say,
or write for what really exists). To put this another way, by
interpreting these documents (which formpart of preconditions
for receiving grant aid) “as if” they were return-gifts, Paragi
effectively regards aid workers and their organizations “as if”
they were equal partners whose moral agency is not affected by
the absence of material reciprocation (on the contrary point, see
Hattori 2003b:161). This raises a political question of knowledge
production: whose end does Paragi’s interpretation serve?
In order to sustain her assertion that an equal partnership
exists in this case, Paragi must provide a much more careful
speciﬁcation of what the relationship between donor and re-
cipient actually entails and how speciﬁcally it is able to overcome
the very real material hierarchy of political and economic power
in which it is situated (on this kind of explanatory critique, see
Collier 1994:169–205). Past studies (e.g., Ostrander 1993) sug-
gest that a critical condition of equality is the willingness of the
donors not only to relinquish control over project design, im-This content downloaded from 128.13
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aplementation, and evaluation to the recipients but also to allow
them to share in funding decisions. The donor-recipient rela-
tionship Paragi studied does not seem to have met this standard.Nora Lester Murad
Aid Watch Palestine and Dalia Association, Jerusalem, Palestine
(noralestermurad@gmail.com). 31 VIII 16
Writing about international aid using the framework of “con-
temporary gifts,” Beáta Paragi breaks ranks with both technical
and political analysts of aid and suggests that anthropology may
offer insight previously hidden. Her deep investigation into
Palestinian “recipient” opinions brings nuance and depth to the
discussion, but given how politicized and damaging aid can be
in Palestine, civil society aid critics like me will bristle at the
contention that aid is a gift.
Paragi and her team interview Palestinian recipients of aid
and cite their statements about partnership, concluding that
aid does evoke concepts of solidarity, equality, and reciproc-
ity. Her assertion is that recipients of aid “return” a gift in the
form of documentation of stories of suffering which, she says,
leads to the constant circulation of the “gift.”
Paragi considers other possibilities, but ultimately decides,
“It is the obscure difference between gift and exchange em-
bodied in the concepts of reciprocity and sacriﬁce . . . comp-
lemented with the ‘subtle balance of dependence and inde-
pendence causing power and control to be deeply ingrained,’
(Komter 2005:70), that will explain the unintended conse-
quences of foreign aid.” The alternative paradigm is that in-
equality is not an unintended consequence of well-intentioned
international aid but rather the intended consequence of self-
interested neoliberal and neocolonial manipulation in the guise
of aid.
The gift logic only works if one believes that international aid
ismotivated by compassion and social responsibility. But even if
there is a compassionate intention motivating international aid,
it is not clear how or why that compassionate intention would
extend beyond the original “giver” (presumably the taxpayer,
who is the source of funds for overseas development assistance)
tomotivate the professional aid actor. The professional aid actor
uses professional discretion to allocate funds but is not the
source of funds, and it is not clear what she or he has “sacriﬁced”
to provide the gift.
On the other hand, if aid was strictly self-interested and
harmful in its impact, we would need another way to explain
the many positive relationships with international aid actors
that Palestinians talked about in Paragi’s interviews. Focusing
on the role of power and coercionmay shed light. Coercion can
be at play even if aid actors do not explicitly use funding as a
stick or carrot (which they sometimes do). For example, power
can be used a priori to limit aid choices (e.g., amounts, mo-
dalities, and terms and conditions) from which civil society
actors then “freely” choose. On a deeper level, power can be5.181.217 on June 02, 2017 08:04:21 AM
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forces within which civil society actors deﬁne themselves and
articulate their interests. Paragi’s informants may perceive their
relationships with aid actors as partnerships, because those who
accept aid are thosewho have been inﬂuenced to perceive aid in a
positive manner.
Terms used by recipients show evidence of this type of in-
visible coercion. Paragi says, “Concepts such as ‘professional-
ism,’ ‘credibility,’ ‘local knowledge,’ ‘transparency,’ or ‘com-
mitment’were widely applied to describe a ‘true partnership’ by
recipient NGOs.” She goes on to say, “Typical to this relation-
ship is the recipient’s ability to ‘propose the project,’ ‘to assess
what is needed in a certain project,’ and ‘to feel [that] we are
one team’ or ‘we work as one family’.” Yet these are not terms
that Palestinians generally use when referring to their own in-
terests and priorities. Why did Paragi’s informants not say that
“true partnership” is based on common commitment to self-
determination, international law, political support, and human
rights? It may be because the aid relationship is already pre-
constituted in apolitical terms, and the recipients do not expect
much beyond grant money. Theymay have already conceded to
work within the agenda set by donors and therefore do not seek
to challenge it within the conﬁnes of a funded project.
It is also possible that personalization of aid relationships
strengthens the ability to perceive aid in gift terms. Paragi says
many Palestinian NGO leaders “experienced equality and
considered themselves ‘full partners,’ being able to inﬂuence
donor policies and priorities.” To the extent that givers or
receivers perceive their interpersonal interactions as consti-
tuting the organizational relationship, they may be distorting
reality. Even if one recipient inﬂuences one individual inter-
national aid actor, there is not likely to be an automatic change
of policy at the organizational level.
Analysis at the interpersonal level may hide rather than ex-
pose political dynamics. In discussing the relationship between
giver and receiver, Paragi seems to prioritize social cohesion
over self-determination. However, social cohesion can grow as
much from dependence and inequality as from freedom. Are
Palestinian informants talking about their goals for their in-
terpersonal relationships or their goals for their people? It is my
experience that professionalized aid usually interferes with the
potential for reciprocity inherent in true philanthropy or soli-
darity. Givers and receivers relating on the basis of shared
interests, rather than on the value of an exchange, builds com-
munity, which is transformational.
In conclusion, while I ﬁnd Paragi’s study to be an important
contribution to understanding the micropolitics of relationships,
I ﬁnd myself resistant to her conclusion that aid in Palestine can
be usefully analyzed in terms of gifts. Perhaps it is my naive or
idealistic view that the value of a gift should be determined by its
value to the recipient, not its value to the giver. If aid actors
wanted to give valuable gifts, they would “give” assistance to end
the conditions that create the need for aid in the ﬁrst place.While
there are certainly aid actors whowork toward this objective, and
while there are certainly are true partnerships between someThis content downloaded from 128.13
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aPalestinians and international aid actors, I suspect these are a
rare few. In these cases, I suspect that aid funds are probably
tangential to the relationship rather than deﬁnitive.
Paragi says that international aid leads to a continuous
“exchange” of “aid for pain.” If that is sufﬁcient to deem aid a
gift, then it may be time to change the way we use the term.Sahar Taghdisi Rad
Department of European and International Studies, King’s College
London, 22 Kingsway, London, United Kingdom (st54@soas.ac.uk).
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There are few political economy relations between national and
international agents that are characterized by more exploitative
dynamics than those instigated by international aid. Paragi’s
analysis of NGOs’ reciprocation of the “contemporary gift” of
aid, although providing some insights into the analysis of hu-
manitarian aid, leaves a number of important gaps in its ap-
plication to development assistance. This comment focuses on
the paper’s analytical shortcomings in two areas: ﬁrst, the rele-
vance of the application of Mauss’s gift exchange framework to
the analysis of development aid, particularly in the context of
one of the most long-lasting conﬂicts in the world; and second,
the author’s implicit treatment of NGOs as an inherent and
unquestioning component of the “recipient” entity.
The article treats the “benevolent gift” of aid as stemming
from “social relations” of “solidarity [and] compassion with the
less fortunate within the international community,” while ar-
guing that, despite the “good” intentions, aid could have some
“ambiguities and unintended consequences.” Paragi’s assump-
tion that aid is inherently “good” and aimed at helping the “less
fortunate” parts of the world is at best optimistic and at worst
dismissive of the widely documented hazardous history of for-
eign aid since its inception. The post–Second World War
Marshal Plan introduced aid as an instrument of not only
gathering allies against the “enemy” but also ensuring that those
allies are economically strong partners. In the words of Presi-
dent Kennedy in 1961, “foreign aid is a method by which the
United States maintains a position of inﬂuence and control
around the world, and sustains a good many countries which
would deﬁnitely collapse, or pass into the Communist bloc”
(Hayter 1971:5).
The increasing focus on aid to developing countries since
the 1970s has carried forward even more intense power
dynamics, aimed at maintaining the global hegemony of
former imperial powers. As Teresa Hayter states in her
seminal work Aid as Imperialism, based on extensive re-
search into Latin America, “aid can be regarded as a con-
cession by the imperialist powers to enable them to continue
their exploitation of the semi-colonial countries . . . [It]
increases the likelihood that the governments of Third
World countries will tolerate the continuation of massive
outﬂows of private proﬁts and interest on past debt. It may5.181.217 on June 02, 2017 08:04:21 AM
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dent on the continued existence of aid and foreign private
investment and which therefore becomes an ally of impe-
rialism” (1971:9). The donors’ continued ﬁnancing of the
Palestinian National Authority since its creation mirrors
this rhetoric (Khalidi and Samour 2011).
The signiﬁcance of aid as a foreign relations tool intensiﬁes
even more in the context of conﬂict zones, such as the oc-
cupied Palestinian territories. Although here peace-building
efforts and conﬂict resolution initially masked donors’ deeper
interests in keeping a stake in the conﬂict, this should not
lead one to take as a starting point of analysis an assumption
of aid as an originally “benevolent gift.” As Anderson (1999:1)
puts it, “when international assistance is given in the context
of a violent conﬂict, it becomes a part of that context and thus
also of the conﬂict.” The World Bank’s 1993 Investment in
Peace set out the shape and direction of a future Palestinian
state and economy even before the Oslo Accords were ﬁnal-
ized, signalling donors’ direct involvement in the conﬂict and
its aftermath.
In this context, an emphasis on the concept of “reciproc-
ity” is also questionable. The political objectives of foreign aid
are already fulﬁlled the moment aid is disbursed, as the
recipient’s dependency on and subsequent submission to the
donor is at once established. Fulﬁlling any form of donor
requirement and conditionality, what Paragi calls “recipro-
cation” then serves a speciﬁc purpose. Assessment of recip-
ients’ use of aid has not been a major concern for many
donors until recently—explaining the establishment of donor
agencies’ evaluation departments only in the late 1990s. In
response to the 1990s aid fatigue, donors pointed ﬁngers at
the recipients by imposing a number of conditions to im-
prove transparency and accountability. Such bureaucratic
box-ticking requirements, which were also imposed on re-
cipients of structural adjustment programs during the same
period, put additional pressure on the recipients’ already
weak administrative capacity with little positive impact on aid
effectiveness. As such, Paragi’s analysis of the NGOs’ reci-
procity responses through “documenting suffering” could
perhaps explain some of the dynamics facing NGOs in the
humanitarian sector but is of limited application to devel-
opment assistance. Today, it is in fact a “positive” language of
“empowerment,” “good governance,” and “equality” that wins
the recipients more aid in the context of aid fatigue.
Paragi’s analysis could also beneﬁt from the broader crit-
ical discourses on the nature of NGOs and their relationship
with the state and external actors. While recognizing the
change in the nature of Palestinian NGOs after the Oslo
Accords, Paragi still treats them as a homogenous component
of what constitutes the “recipient.” Contrary to the classical
notion of the civil society, the post-Oslo aid-dependent
Palestinian NGO body has, with exceptions, been seen as
bound to the state power and donor apparatus by ties of
cooperation rather than opposition. From a Gramscian per-
spective, the civil society, deﬁned more broadly than NGOsThis content downloaded from 128.13
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aper se, is closely linked to the “political society”: while the
state uses coercion, the civil society creates consent with the
ongoing hegemonic order. As such, the civil society, with
NGOs as a component of it, cannot be analyzed distinctly
from the state and the donors. In Palestine, this “NGO-
ization” is believed to have contributed to the transformation
of the national agenda from a struggle for self-determination
and sovereignty to a particular and limited set of technical
issues concerning peace building, conﬂict resolution, and
other issues related to donor funding interest. Through ac-
tivities that emphasize the individual over the community,
the NGOs have at times contributed to the fragmentation of
the Palestinian society while nurturing “globalized Pales-
tinian elites” (Hanaﬁ and Tabar 2002) in support of donor
agendas and the peace process and distant from local stake-
holders and radical politics.Alaa Tartir
Centre on Conﬂict, Development, and Peacebuilding, Institut de
Hautes Études Internationales et du Développement, 1211 Geneva 1,
Switzerland (alaa.tartir@graduateinstitute.ch). 25 IX 16
International Aid to Palestinians: A Cursed Gift
Over $30 billion has been spent since 1993 by international
donors as aid for Palestinians living in the occupied West
Bank and Gaza Strip (OECD 2016). This “investment” in
peace and development has made Palestinians one of the
highest per capita recipients of nonmilitary aid in the world.
In spite of those sums, however, peace and development re-
main elusive, and this aid has failed to achieve its three main
objectives: lasting peace, effective and accountable Palestinian
institutions, and sustainable socioeconomic development. In-
stead, Palestinians are forced to live in an aid-development
paradox: increased amounts of aid are associated with major
declines in socioeconomic and development indicators.
This aid has failed the Palestinian people miserably. It has
failed to make them feel more secure, it has failed to reverse
the cycles of de-development, it has entrenched the status of
a captive Palestinian economy that is unproductive and aid-
reliant, it has created structural deﬁciencies in the governance
realm, and it has sustained and subsidized the Israeli military
occupation. It also sustains the Palestinian National Au-
thority (PNA), which is a heavy burden on the Palestinian
people, and has resulted in major negative transformations in
the Palestinian civil society, creating an “NGO republic” in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Around 10% of aid is received
by the highly aid-reliant Palestinian NGOs (DeVoir and
Tartir 2009).
These established arguments and conclusions in the critical
literature on the political economy of aid in Palestine perceive
“aid-as-a-gift” as a problematic notion and as an idea full of
tensions and contradictions. The burden of that “gift” (aid) is5.181.217 on June 02, 2017 08:04:21 AM
nd Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
000 Current Anthropology Volume 58, Number 3, June 2017much bigger (in terms of social, economic, and political con-
sequences and ramiﬁcations) than the gift itself, and therefore
it is a twice-cursed gift: it curses the giver and the receiver.
The mere “giving” of aid within the existing framework
cannot be a sign of “strong international solidarity.” The aid
industry is not an innocent one; it results in effective “re-
versed solidarity” with destructive consequences. Arguably,
understanding aid within the framework of theories of gift
exchange undermines other key understandings, such as aid-
as-right and aid-as-obligation. A gift exchange model also
assumes the existence of two actors in the process of giving,
the donor and the recipient. However, in the case of Pales-
tine, the ultimate beneﬁciary of this aid is a third actor (the
Israeli occupier) who is not sufﬁciently considered by the gift
exchange model. Research shows that a considerable portion
of aid to Palestinians (which could reach up to 78%; Hever
2015) is redirected to Israel’s economy. In this case, aid to
Palestinians, within the existing aid industry conﬁgurations
as designed by the World Bank more than two decades ago, is
a generous gift to Israel, its military occupation, and its illegal
colonies/settlement expansion project and is a pure curse to
the Palestinians.
Yet, the Palestinian actors, either governmental or non-
governmental bodies, are not able or willing to exit the harmful
aid game. And they therefore become part of the problem by
accepting, happily in most cases, the cursed gift instead of
confronting the conditionality attached with this gift and
challenging its assumptions, objectives, delivery, allocation,
and indeed the overall framework of giving. This aid-curse
could be gradually reversed; however, the vested interests of
the political and NGO elite whom the aid industry has created
are blocking any meaningful and fundamental reform to the
failed Oslo aid model (in addition to the similar role resumed
by the donors, as Dr. Jeremy Wildeman and I have reported
and argued in multiple articles; Wildeman and Tartir 2013,
2014). This can be testiﬁed to by some of the NGO voices, as
reported by Dr. Paragi, who argued that they dictate and lead
the aid-giving process and refuse the donors conditionality.
There is ample evidence that suggests the implausibility of
such self-serving voices, as they dismiss the failing patterns of
aid and the miserable realities on the ground. Such voices are
instead occupied by technical reporting to the donors and by
the creation of different forms of pegging as tools for fund-
raising.
Indeed, not all Palestinian NGO and civil society actors can
be put in one basket, because there are genuine success stories.
But it is safe to argue that the micro successes proclaimed by
the majority of NGOs and their donors, as testiﬁed to by their
reports, newsletters, videos, and social media pages, are ironic
if not surreal, when contrasted with the macro-mega failures
(e.g., the failure of aid to reconstruct Gaza, or the entrench-
ment of the intra-Palestinian divide and fragmentation, or the
failure to reverse the cycles of de-development and defeat
dependency). The macro-micro paradox of the aid industry in
Palestine explains the continued existence of failing processes:This content downloaded from 128.13
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms athe majority of actors (recipients and donors) are always busy
with their operational and bureaucratic processes while eagerly
dismissing the overall picture that they are unable or unwilling
to change.
Finally, the role of emotions in the process of aid giving
and receiving is far from straightforward. The Israeli colo-
nization of Palestine is not a humanitarian crisis that evokes a
sense of compassion and pity in aid actors. The destruction of
Gaza is not a natural disaster but a man-made one, and
poverty in Palestine is politically constructed. Therefore, the
aid ineffectiveness is not due to technical failures or to the
failure of transforming the emotions of the well-intended aid
workers into actions. Feeling “sorry” for the Palestinians but
being unable and in most cases unwilling to challenge the
power dynamics and to confront the damaging status quo of
the aid industry and military occupation adds another layer
to the cursed aid model, as the politics of emotions can be
used as remedy for the feeling of guilt. Certainly, this is not to
argue that the individual aid workers are necessarily doing
harm, but this is to argue that the collective emotions and
actions of aid workers (and their subordinate aid recipients)
are dictated by rigid, self-enforcing, and self-serving aid struc-
tures and inappropriate frameworks that are doing harm by
denying the right of the Palestinians to development and self-
determination.
Dr. Beáta Paragi’s contribution reveals some of the key
complex dynamics that feature in the aid industry in Palestine
and operationalizes dimensions related to “contemporary gifts”
from theNGOperspective. The vicious cycle (“aid for pain, pain
for aid”) will continue to do harm, as discussed by Dr. Paragi,
until the failed Oslo aid model is laid to rest.Reply
In this article, I argue that, if foreign aid can be conceptualized
within the analytical framework of gift exchange theories, then
return-gifts deserve to be acknowledged and identiﬁed. I have
received ﬁve comments. Let me reply to them in the following
way.
Annalisa Furia focuses on the role played by politically rele-
vant emotions (e.g., compassion, solidarity, pity, and fear).
Citing two conﬂicting views—Martha Nussbaum saying “the
political cultivation of emotions is of crucial importance for
liberal societies that aspire to [achieve] justice and equal op-
portunity for all” and emphasizing that “compassion can [thus]
favour, and be fully compatible with, the respect of others’
dignity, capabilities and autonomy” and Hanna Arendt arguing
that the French revolutionists introduced “the ruinous idea that
one should attempt to ‘improve the lot of the unfortunate rather
than to establish justice for all’ ”—Dr. Furia draws attention to
the contested and ambiguous role of emotions. Her reading of5.181.217 on June 02, 2017 08:04:21 AM
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part of a complex net of contract-like relationships,” is very
much in line with ﬁndings indicating the instrumental role
emotions play in raising awareness and strengthening solidarity
between people living geographically far away.
Objections formulated by Nora Murad and Sahar Taghdisi
Rad are closely linked to the contested role of emotions. In their
reading, “the gift logic only works if one believes that interna-
tional aid is motivated by compassion and social responsibility,”
and I assume “that aid is inherently good and aimed at helping
the ‘less fortunate’ parts of the world [which] is at best optimistic
and at worst dismissive of the widely documented hazardous
history of foreign aid since its inception.” It is true that I do not
provide any detailed account of the failures of the foreign-aid
regime. Neither do I believe, however, that my argument would
have required it (as I made a reference to Furia 2015, among
others). I did not claim that foreign aid or the regime behind it
has ever been good, but I doubt whether development (hu-
manitarian) cooperation can be understood, or judged, without
acknowledging the intentions, sentiments, and emotions on the
donor side (or on the recipient side, for that matter). Western
donor countries are democracies, and as such, they cannot ig-
nore their public opinion. If the solidaritymotive (in general, the
role of emotions) is irrelevant in aid relations, how do recipients
claim to campaign for more foreign aid?17
Various Eurobarometer surveys document clearly that most
Europeans do believe in the positive role played by foreign aid in
international relations, which cannot be ignored by donors as
political powers (Eurobarometer 2005, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2013).
A large majority of respondents in Europe say it is important or
very important to help people in developing countries (aver-
age 89%; Eurobarometer 2015). There is no reason to assume
that the Palestinian case would be an exception. In 2015, 76% of
respondents were convinced that aid for developing countries
contributes to a more peaceful and equal world, whereas 74%
agreed that tackling poverty in developing countries is a moral
obligation for the EU (Eurobarometer 2015). Not onlyWestern
“neoliberal” powers (donor governments), but the general Eu-
ropean—and American, for that matter—public seems to have
grown used to the notion that “they can shape and control most
aspects of power and policy across the Arab world, whether due
to imperial self-interest, energy requirements, economic needs,
or pro-Israeli biases” (Khouri 2011). Indeed, as indicated by the
Eurobarometer surveys, most of the Europeans are ready to
provide help for the developing world, the Middle East in-
cluded, even if they do not know precisely the scope or mag-
nitude of the problem to be solved (as public opinion polls are
not school exams).17. The Arab Barometer (2014) survey indicates a high rate of support
for foreign aid in general. Focusing on Egypt, Jordan, and Palestine
(Lebanon and Iraqmay serve as a comparison), an overwhelmingmajority
would support a further increase in foreign aid (Egypt: 83.8%; Jordan:
78.7%; Palestine: 83.5%), even if half of the population (at least) simul-
taneously express discontent with it. See Arab Barometer Wave III, q701,
question on the future of foreign aid.
This content downloaded from 128.13
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aContemporary international solidarity, even if only compassion-
based, self-serving, or ironic, is so closely linked to the concept
of global justice that it is the sense of injustice—for example the
Palestinian pain in Gaza or the West Bank—combined with
the spectacle of suffering (Chouliaraki 2013) that mobilizes
Western and regional public support for ofﬁcial foreign aid
and private charities in donor countries; they complement the
ofﬁcial foreign policy interests. This mobilization—and here I
agree with the reviewers—does not mean that international
solidarity (in form of aid) can buy justice and truth in the re-
cipient country.18
Following Mauss, many—Sahlins (1972), Alan D. Schrift
(1997), and Marcel Hénaff (2010a)—claimed that giving is
mostly of a positive nature: relationships established by the
gift guarantee the core of any social bond. In other words, “to
give is to recognize in order to be recognized” (Hénaff 2010a).
However, analyzing the practice and forms of gift-giving be-
tween individuals, the American philosopher Michael Sandel
argued that money, including monetized or in-kind gifts, can-
not buy friendship and function, at most, as tokens and ex-
pressions of friendship. Converting gestures or gifts into com-
modities does not destroy them altogether, Sandel argues, but
it apparently diminishes their value. Money or gifts—aid for
that matter—cannot buy friends, since true friendship and
the related social practices that sustain friendship are constituted
by shared norms, attitudes, and virtues.19 Commodifying these
practices is possible, but it displaces essential norms—sympathy,
solidarity, generosity, and thoughtfulness—by replacing them
with market values. To sum up Sandel’s argument, if money
can buy friendship, it can do it only in a degraded form (Sandel
2011:107). The history of aid (money) and the contested rela-
tions between donors and recipients prove that this conclusion
applies not only at the micro level but also to organizational-
level cooperation between NGOs and to ofﬁcial aid relations
at the macro level (between governments).
By discussing the existence of “reciprocity” and “return-gifts”
(admittedly, only at the NGO level), I intended to draw atten-
tion to the irony embodied in the relations between recipients
and their donors. I agree with Taghdisi Rad that “the civil so-
ciety, or NGOs in this context, cannot be analyzed distinctly
from the state and the donors.” Their activities, however,
complement and serve the ofﬁcial and macro-level policies
(politics) not only according to Gramsci but by the very deﬁ-
nition of ODA. Most civil recipients cannot but comply with
the technical conditions formulated by their donors (e.g., re-
sponding to calls, writing proposals and appeals, making ﬁnal
reports, and guiding evaluation committees). They cannot but
accept the rules of the game formulated at higher levels. Trans-
parency and accountability do not simply serve aid effective-18. On the hegemony of contemporary solidarity, see a sister article
based on the same data set and published in Alternatives: Global, Local,
and Political (Paragi 2016b).
19. It applies to relations explored by political science and interna-
tional relations too.
5.181.217 on June 02, 2017 08:04:21 AM
nd Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
000 Current Anthropology Volume 58, Number 3, June 2017ness (Furia 2015) but allow the donors to know and control
their recipients too. By participation, people working at local
civil society organizations often ﬁnd themselves caught be-
tween their own history, culture, and society on the one hand
and the externally deﬁned donor priorities and values on the
other hand (Andersen 2012; Contu and Girei 2014; Khan,
Westwood, and Boje 2011).
Hattori’s critique centers around the concept of “unilat-
eral” gifts, emphasizing that “Pierre Bourdieu’s (1977:5) no-
tion of the misrecognized suspension of reciprocation for an
uncertain period and Jonathan Parry’s conception of a uni-
lateral gift (1986) inspired [his] own reconceptualization of
grant foreign aid as an unreciprocated giving practice sym-
bolizing and naturalizing the material hierarchy that makes it
possible (Hattori 2001).” Stressing that foreign aid (grants) is
not only ﬁnancially unreciprocated but also unreciprocated
in any other (nonmaterial) terms, Hattori further argues—in
a similar way to Nora Murad, who says that “inequality is not
an unintended consequence of well-intentioned international
aid but rather the intended consequence of self-interested
neoliberal and neocolonial manipulation in the guise of
aid”—that I fail to address the question of (in)equality by
identifying return-gifts, that is, by “interpreting these docu-
ments (which form part of preconditions for receiving grant
aid) ‘as if ’ they were return-gifts” and effectively regarding
“aid workers and their organizations ‘as if ’ they were equal
partners.” I do not think that this reﬂects what I wrote. My
article has been about perceptions—about how people working
at various Palestinian aid recipient organizations think about
their cooperation with their donors. Some of them reported
equality, others emphasized its lack. A careful reading of the
article makes clear the distinctions between respondents’ ex-
periences and my interpretation, on the one hand, and the
experiences reported at the micro level and the reality of the
macro level, on the other hand. It must also be emphasized
that reciprocity does not necessarily imply the strict equiva-
lence of beneﬁts. While “rough equivalence” is the usual ex-
pectation “among equals,” reciprocity can also characterize
relations among unequals in international relations (Keohane
1986) both at the macro and meso/micro levels.
My main problem with the unilateral or unreciprocated
interpretation of donor money concerns (the lack of) rec-
ognition. If reciprocity is denied and if (symbolic, nonma-
terial) return-gifts are neither recognized nor acknowledged,
the recipient, the recipient’s identity, and the entire rela-
tionship become somehow inferior. It implies, on the one
hand, that donors give for pure pleasure, for fun, and for
“symbolic domination”—indeed, that is, that donors give in
order to take something that would otherwise not be given by
the recipient. On the other hand, the time and energy, all of
the (otherwise scarce) resources invested by the recipients
into any aid project (from proposal writing through imple-
mentation to reporting), become secondary—along with the
substance: their misfortune, pain, underdevelopment, and the
lived reality of injustice.This content downloaded from 128.13
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aGifts (foreign grants) are invited by the pure existence of a
person living in poverty and suffering injustice. As Georg
Simmel argued long ago, “poverty is relational and it is assis-
tance which creates the poor”—in order to prevent him from
revolting (Simmel 1965:138). This is what Michael Dufﬁeld
called “ ‘the riot control’ end of a spectrum encompassing a
broad range of global poor relief ” in the context of contempo-
rary foreign aid (Dufﬁeld 2001:9). But how can the “poor” or the
“sufferer” return the gift? In the very moment when money,
gifts, or in-kind assistance is offered with the promise of cure
(e.g., eliminating poverty and alleviating suffering), images,
stories, and other documentation of misfortune may become a
commodity, an object to be exchanged. Without the market-
able story—without images, reports, documents, appeals, and
proposals, without discourse on poverty, underdevelopment,
and suffering—there is no money. The contemporary history
of foreign aid proves it beyond any doubt. As argued by Chris
Gregory (1982:100–101), “Commodity exchange is anexchange
of alienable objects between people who are in a state of re-
ciprocal independence that establishes a quantitative relation-
ship between the objects exchanged . . . Gift exchange [how-
ever] is an exchange of inalienable objects between people
who are in a state of reciprocal dependence that establishes a
qualitative relationship.” Donor money (aid) is of alienable
nature; the return-gift (the experience of suffering and pain) is
not. Documenting and documents, however, turn them into
“inalienable” objects to be delivered to the donor.
It is even more sad, even ironic, that segments of recipient
societies are forced to compete for donor money. Indeed, it is
not simply “pain” (as an inalienable object) that matters, but
how it is sold: the better a story is documented and marketed,
the more attention and money is generated. If it sounds out-
rageous, the alternative interpretation is not at all more fa-
vorable. In the absence of material or symbolic reciprocity, the
gift-relation is not about exchange (as Mauss and his followers
maintain), and it has nothing to do with solidarity, either;
rather, the opposite is the case. Invented and explored by
Michel Serres (1982), it is the concept of the parasite that
describes the relations when the receiver is “always taking,
never giving” (cited by Pyyhtinen 2014:12, 67). The parasite
takes advantage of its relationship with the giver/donor with-
out being able or willing to contribute to the social order by
reciprocity. If the current order of international relations, in-
ternational development cooperation included, is based on
nonreciprocity (as Hattori maintains), foreign aid cannot but
produce international parasites. The only way to escape this
conclusion is to acknowledge the existence of return-gifts,
however ironic that sounds.
If Mauss claimed that there is amagical force included in the
given thing, Marcel Hénaff argued that the implication of the
donor in the given thing involves “a transfer of soul and of
substantial presence” and “the entire network of gift exchange”
is constructed of the fact “that everyone must place something
of himself at risk outside of his own place and receive some-
thing from others within its own space” (Henaff 2010a:126).5.181.217 on June 02, 2017 08:04:21 AM
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acknowledged not only by the Palestinians who were inter-
viewed but by the reviews of the original article itself (by Tar-
tir, Taghdisi Rad, and Murad)—makes it possible to interpret
aid within the “gift exchange” framework. If recipients are
forced to absorb “abstract” neoliberal ideas (alongside with their
much less abstract, practical consequences) as part of the aid
package (Nakheh 2013; Tabar 2015; Tartir 2014), donors may
also receive stories of misfortune (poverty, pain) in the form of
documents as return-gifts.
I am grateful for the comments. Even if I could not reply to
all of the remarks, I have learned a lot by reading them. I have
only one ﬁnal thought regarding Hattori’s question on the
politics of knowledge production. Although I received funding
from the EU and Norway, my research was not a commis-
sioned research project. I simply made interviews and inter-
preted the data without anyone telling me what to think or
what to write. Hattori’s question is interesting and a bit pro-
vocative, if not cynical (if I seem to be a bit too sensitive here,
that is because I have a Hungarian passport and the subject of
the paper concerned the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict). These
sorts of questions are quite popular in certain parts of the
world—take Russia, Israel, Egypt, and Hungary, for example
(Economist 2014). It may be only a matter of time until not
only civil society activists but also researchers in the academic
sector will also be asked to keep their distance from anything
that might be of a political nature if they accept “foreign”
funding.20 To sum up, I hope the article itself and my reply
give an adequate answer to Hattori’s question.
—Beáta Paragi
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